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Abstract: 
This thesis proposes an Intrusion Detection System, NeuDetect, which applies Neural Network 
technique to wireless network packets captured through hardware sensors for purposes of real 
time detection of anomalous packets. To address the problem of high false alarm rate 
confronted by the current wireless intrusion detection systems, this thesis presents a method of 
applying the artificial neural networks technique to the wireless network intrusion detection 
system. 
The proposed system solution approach is to find normal and anomalous patterns on pre-
processed wireless packet records by comparing them with training data using Back-
propagation algorithm. An anomaly score is assigned to each packet by calculating the 
difference between the output error and threshold. If the anomaly score is positive then the 
wireless packet is flagged as anomalous and is negative then the packet is flagged as normal. If 
the anomaly score is zero or close to zero it will be flagged as an unknown attack and will be 
sent back to training process for re-evaluation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: 
Computer security is starting to become one of the more active areas in Computer Science and 
Engineering. Almost everyday some flaw is found in a protocol, a program, or a system. These 
flaws sometimes lead to security breaches that affect many companies and nations worldwide. 
Network security solutions are generally grouped into two main categories: prevention-based 
techniques and detection-based techniques. Prevention-based techniques, such as encryption 
and authentication, are often the first line of defense against an attacker to reduce intrusions but 
cannot eliminate them (Onat and Miri 2005). For example, encryption and authentication 
cannot defend against compromised sensor nodes, which carry the private keys. From the 
experiences of security research, no matter how many intrusion prevention messages are 
inserted in a network, there are always some weak links that one could exploit to break in. 
Detection-based techniques aim at identifying and excluding the attacker after prevention-
based techniques fail. The detection techniques are categorized into signature and anomaly 
detection. Signature detection techniques match known attack profiles with the current events, 
whereas anomaly detection detects significant deviations from the established system normally. 
Intrusion detection presents a second wall of defense and it is a necessity in any high 
survivability network (Zhang and Lee 2000). 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are vulnerable to security attacks. WSNs can be deployed 
in hostile environments and sensor nodes may be compromised. WSNs are always unattended 
but physically reachable from the outside world, so they are vulnerable to security attacks. 
Intruders, impersonating legitimate nodes, may disrupt the network operation by injecting false 
information or by not cooperating in tasks such as packet forwarding. Such malicious node 
activity can severely affect the network operation. Therefore, WSNs must be secured to 
prevent an intruder from obstructing the delivery of correct sensor data. In wireless networks, 
prevention-based security techniques are less effective because of the shared broadcast medium 
and resource-limited network elements (Onat and Miri 2005). In multihop wireless networks, 
nodes forward packets for other nodes and this requires additional trust requirements which 
increase the complexity of prevention-based security solutions. As a multihop wireless 
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network, securing the WSNs with conventional prevention techniques is difficult due to 
scalability problems, computation, communication and the storage overhead associated with 
these methods. To provide a secure wireless sensor network, we need to deploy intrusion 
detection and response techniques. 
Intrusion detection research has generally focused on wired networks (Khoshgoftaar et al. 
2005). The increasing reliance upon wireless networks has put tremendous emphasis on 
wireless network security. Current WSNs are based on the IEEE 802.11 standard which is 
known to have security flaws (Barbara et al. 2001). Recent efforts on WSN security have 
generally focused on improving the network architecture or protocols and on detecting a 
specific attack (CISCO 2007). 
Most IDSs are based on hand-crafted signatures that are developed by manual encoding of 
expert knowledge (Ertoz et al. 2004). These systems match activity on the system being 
monitored to known signatures of attacks. The major problem with this approach is that these 
IDSs fail to generalize to detect new attacks or attacks without known signatures. Recently, 
there has been an increased interest in data mining based approaches to building detection 
models for IDSs. These models generalize from both known attacks and normal behavior in 
order to detect unknown attacks. They can also be generated in a quicker and more automated 
method than manually encoded models that require difficult analysis of audit data by domain 
experts. Several effective data mining techniques for detecting intrusions have been developed 
(CISCO 2007; Gantenbein et al. 2002; Julisch and Dacier 2002; Barbara et al. 2001), many of 
which perform close to or better than systems engineered by domain experts. We know that 
data mining is a collection of powerful data analysis techniques intended to assist in analyzing 
extremely large datasets. Data mining is not a single approach but a set of techniques that can 
often be used in combination with each others to extract the maximum insight from a dataset. 
Properly applied, data mining can reveal hidden relationships and information buried within an 
organization's data warehouse. 
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1.1. Thesis Contribution: 
This thesis proposes a wireless intrusion detection system named NeuDetect, with the 
following major intentions: 
Real-Time Intrusion Detection: Many existing intrusion detection systems (Lee and Stolfo 
2000; Ertoz et al. 2004) rely heavily on manual intervention by a security administrator to 
effectively protect networks. In the proposed system we have used proprietary hardware 
sensors, where streams of wireless packets (e.g., MAC frames) from Access Points (AP) are 
instantly captured and processed by using neural network techniques. 
Training Data: Our proposed system uses training data. In the Detection Module of our 
system, we have used a classifier using Back-Propagation Neural Network Algorithm to train 
the system with crafted attacks and then to classify the incoming data packets comparing with 
the trained attack database. 
Faster Processing: The inherent speed of neural networks is another benefit of this approach. 
Because the protection of computing resources requires the timely identification of attacks, the 
processing speed of the neural network, even in a high speed network, enables intrusion 
responses to be conducted before irreparable damage occurs to the system. Snort-Wireless (Air 
Snort 2007) has a low attack detection rate in high speed network (Ejelike 2008). Our system is 
capable to detect wireless attacks in high speed networks with acceptable false alarm rate. 
Dynamically Updating Intrusion Database: The proposed system has the dynamic ability to 
enhance the intrusion database in continuing to reevaluate the unknown packets through the 
training process. An anomaly score is assigned to each packet by calculating the difference 
between the output error and threshold. If the anomaly score is positive then the relevant 
wireless packet will be flagged as anomaly and an attack number is assigned for future 
comparison with incoming packets. If the anomaly score is zero or close to zero the packet will 
be flagged as unknown packet and sent back to training process. Finally if the anomaly score is 
negative then the packet is flagged as normal. 
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Accuracy: Our proposed system uses training data to recognize known suspicious events with 
a high degree of accuracy. ADAM has low attack detection rate especially in Man-in-Middle 
type of attacks, about 65%, and also produces a lot of false alerts (Liu et al. 2007). Our system 
can detect the attacks with more than 94% detection rate. 
Unknown Attacks: Our system can detect unknown attacks with acceptable false alarm rate 
(11%). Then these unknown attacks are added to the training samples to identify accurately as 
known attacks later. 
Reduced False Alarm Rate: Our system reduces the false alarm rate in detecting unknown 
intrusions by using Back-Propagation (which is discussed later) neural network classification 
and self-organization techniques. We have investigated that Snort-Wireless (Air Snort 2007) 
and Clustering Approach (Khoshgoftaar et al. 2005) have high false positive detection rate 
(Ezeife et al. 2008). Our system can detect attacks with about 2% false positive and 5.5% false 
negative detection rate which are better than some other existing wireless IDS like Snort-
Wireless (Air Snort 2007), ADAM (Barbara et al. 2001), Wifi-Miner (Ezeife et al. 2008), 
WIDCA (Ezeife et al. 2008), etc. 
1.2. Thesis Outline: 
This report is organized as follows: the rest of the chapter 1 introduces wireless sensor network 
architecture, standard wireless protocol IEEE 802.11 's authentication processes and 
vulnerabilities, intrusion classifications in wireless sensor network, types of attack, data mining 
techniques in network intrusion detection systems. Chapter 2 discusses related work in network 
intrusion detection systems that uses data mining techniques like association rule, classification 
rule and cluster analysis algorithms for both wired and wireless network intrusion detection 
systems, their limitations and technologies. Chapter 3 explains our proposed system's 
algorithm and technology. Chapter 4 describes the experimental results of our system. Finally 
Chapter 5 consists of conclusions and future work. 
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1.3. Wireless Sensor Network 
A wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of a large number of sensor nodes. WSNs support 
many novel and existing applications such as environment monitoring, infrastructure 
management, public safety, medical and health care, home and office security, transportation, 
and military applications. The sensor nodes are deployed over an area and form a wireless 
network. The position of sensor nodes need not be engineered or pre-determined. The sensor 
nodes are autonomous devices with limited battery, computational power, and memory. A 
large number of sensor nodes are densely deployed and they have a short communication 
range. Hence, multihop communication in sensor networks is expected to consume less power 
than the traditional single-hop communication. Furthermore, the transmission power levels can 
be kept low, which is highly desired in covert operations. Multihop communication can also 
effectively overcome some of the signal propagation effects experienced in long-distance 
wireless communication (Akyildiz et al. 2002). 
A unique feature of sensor networks is the cooperative effort of sensor nodes. Sensor nodes are 
fitted with an on-board processor. Instead of sending raw data to the nodes responsible for the 
fusion, sensor nodes use their processing abilities to carry out simple computations locally and 
transmit only the required and partially-processed data. 
Figure -1 shows the complexity of wireless sensor networks, which generally consist of a data-
acquisition network and a data-distribution network, monitored and controlled by a 
management center. The over abundance of available technologies makes even the selection of 
components difficult, let alone the design of a consistent, reliable, robust overall system (Lewis 
2004). 
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Figure 1: Wireless Sensor Networks 
1.3.1. WSN Operation Modes: 
802.11 wireless networks operate in one of two modes - Ad-hoc and Infrastructure mode. The 
IEEE standard defines the ad-hoc mode as Independent Basic Service Set (IBSS), and the 
infrastructure mode as Basic Service Set (BSS). In the remainder of this section, we explain the 
differences between the two modes and how they operate. 
In ad hoc mode, each client communicates directly with the other clients within the network by 
using 802.11 a/b/g or Bluetooth standards, see figure 2. Ad-hoc mode is designed such that 
only the clients within transmission range (within the same cell) of each other can 
communicate. If a client in an ad-hoc network wishes to communicate outside of the cell, a 
member of the cell MUST operate as a gateway and perform routing. 
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Client C 
Figure 2: Example ad-hoc network 
In infrastructure mode, A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) can be easily built using only a few 
simple devices which mainly include a radio transceiver, called Access Point (AP), which is 
essentially a small transmitter and receiver with a wired connection into an Asymmetric Digital 
Subscriber Line (ADSL) link or Ethernet LAN. It forms an association with a wireless device 
and acts as an intermediate between the client and the wired connection, providing 
authentication and seamless access. A Network Interface Card (NIC) with 802.11 capabilities 
which talks to the radio transceiver and allows the data transfer to and from your computer. 
Each client sends all of its communications to a central station, or access point (AP). The 
access point acts as an Ethernet bridge and forwards the communications onto the appropriate 
network- either the wired network, or the wireless network, see figure 3. 
Access'Point 
Client B 
Figure 3: Example infrastructure network 
Prior to communicating data, wireless clients and access points must establish a relationship, or 
an association. Only after an association is established can the two wireless stations exchange 
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data. In infrastructure mode, the clients associate with an access point. The association process 
evolves in the following three states: 
• Unauthenticated and unassociated, 
• Authenticated and unassociated, and 
• Authenticated and associated 
To transition between the states, the communicating parties exchange messages called 
management frames. 
We will now walk through a wireless client finding and associating with an access point. All 
access points transmit a beacon management frame at fixed interval. To associate with an 
access point and join a BSS, a client listens for beacon messages to identify the access points 
within range. The client then selects the BSS to join in a vendor independent manner. A client 
may also send a probe request management frame to find an access point affiliated with a 
desired SSID. After identifying an access point, the client and the access point perform a 
mutual authentication by exchanging several management frames as part of the process. After 
successful authentication, the client moves into the second state, authenticated and 
unassociated. Moving from the second state to the third and final state, authenticated and 
associated, involves the client sending an association request frame, and the access point 
responding with an association response frame. After following the above process, the client 
becomes a peer on the wireless network, and can transmit data frames on the network. 
1.3.2 Characteristics and Requirements for WSN 
Due to the characteristics and limitations of WSNs, the following are the requirements in 
building applications on this type of network (Culler et al. 2004): 
I. Large number of sensors: 
Cheap small-sized sensors are used for the summarized information in it. 
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II. Low energy use: 
In many applications, the sensor nodes will be deployed in a remote area in which case 
servicing a node may not be possible. Thus, the lifetime of a node may be determined by the 
battery life, thereby requiring minimal energy expenditure. 
III. Efficient use of the small memory: 
When building sensor networks, issues such as routing-tables, data replication, security and 
such should be considered to fit the small size of memory in the sensor nodes. 
IV. Data aggregation: 
The huge number of sensing nodes may congest the network with information. To solve this 
problem, some sensors such as the cluster heads can aggregate the data, do some computation 
(e.g., average, summation, highest, etc.), and then broadcast the summarized new information. 
V. Network self-organization: 
Given the large number of nodes and their potential placement in hostile locations, it is 
essential that the network be able to self-organize itself. Moreover, nodes may fail (either from 
lack of energy or from physical destruction), and new nodes may need to join the network. 
Therefore, the network must be able to periodically reconfigure itself so that it can continue to 
function. Individual nodes may become disconnected from the rest of the network, but a high 
degree of connectivity overall must be maintained. 
VI. Collaborative signal processing: 
Yet another factor that distinguishes these networks from Mobile Ad-hoc Networks 
(MANETs) is that the end goal is the detection/estimation of some event(s) of interest, and not 
just communication. To improve the detection performance, it is often quite useful to fuse data 
from multiple sensors. This data fusion requires the transmission of data and control messages. 
This need may put constraints on the network architecture. 
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VII. Querying ability: 
There are two types of addressing in sensor networks: data-centric, and address-centric. In 
data-centric, a query will be sent to a specific region in the network. Whereas, in addressing-
centric, the query will be sent to an individual node. 
1.4. WLAN Standard Protocol: IEEE 802.11 
Since the ratification of the IEEE 802.1 lb standard in 1999, wireless LANs have become more 
prevalent. Today, wireless LANs are widely deployed in places such as corporate office 
conference rooms, industrial warehouses, Internet-ready classrooms, and even coffee houses. 
These IEEE 802.11-based, commonly known by Wi-Fi, wireless LANs present new challenges 
for network administrators and information security administrators alike. Unlike the relative 
simplicity of wired Ethernet deployments, 802.11-based wireless LANs broadcast radio-
frequency (RF) data for the client stations to hear. This presents new and complex security 
issues that involve augmenting the 802.11 standard. 
Security in the IEEE 802.11 specification—which applies to 802.11a, 802.11b, and 802.1 lg— 
has come under intense scrutiny. The 801.22b standard is the first widely used standard and is 
known as Wi-Fi. Later in 2003, 801.1 lg standard was developed to operate in the same 2.4 
GHz band as in 801.1 lb but with a higher speed of 55 Mbps. Currently, both of them denote 
Wi-Fi standards. Researchers have exposed several vulnerabilities in the authentication, data-
privacy, and message-integrity mechanisms defined in the specification. These are reviewed in 
this part 
• The authentication and data-privacy functions described in Clause 8 of the IEEE 802.11 
specification 
• The inherent security vulnerabilities and management issues of these functions 
• How security issues can be addressed effectively only by augmenting the 
802.11 security standard 
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1.4.1. 802.11 Authentication Processes 
Wireless LANs, because of their broadcast nature, require the addition of user authentication to 
prevent unauthorized access to network resources and data privacy to protect the integrity and 
privacy of transmitted data. The 802.11 specification stipulates two mechanisms for 
authenticating wireless LAN clients: open authentication and shared key authentication. Two 
other mechanisms—the Service Set Identifier (SSID) and authentication by client Media 
Access Control (MAC) address—are also commonly used. This section explains each approach 
and its weaknesses. 
The use of Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) keys can function as a type of access control 
because a client that lacks the correct WEP key cannot send data to or receive data from an 
access point. WEP, the encryption scheme adopted by the IEEE 802.11 committee, provides 
encryption with 40 bits or 104 bits of key strength. We will discuss WEP and its weaknesses in 
brief. 
I. Service Set Identifier (SSID) 
The SSID is a construct that allows logical separation of wireless LANs. In general, a client 
must be configured with the appropriate SSID to gain access to the wireless LAN. The SSID 
does not provide any data-privacy functions, nor does it truly authenticate the client to the 
access point. 
II. 802.11 Authentication 
Authentication in the 802.11 specification is based on authenticating a wireless station or 
device instead of authenticating a user. The specification provides for two modes of 
authentication (CISCO 2007): 
• Open authentication 
• Shared key authentication 
Another authentication process is widely used, MAC Address Authentication, which is not 
described in 802.11 specification. 
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II. a. Open Authentication 
Open system authentication is the default authentication protocol for 802.11. As the name 
implies, open system authentication authenticates anyone who requests authentication. 
Essentially, it provides a NULL authentication process. The 802.11 open authentication 
process consists of the following transactions (Figure 4): 
1. Client broadcasts a probe request frame on every channel 
2. Access points within range respond with a probe response frame 
3. The client decides which access point (AP) is the best for access and sends an 
authentication request 
4. The access point will send an authentication reply 
o 
5. Upon successful authentication, the client will send an association request frame to 
the access point 
6. The access point will reply with an association response 
7. The client is now able to pass traffic to the access point 
Clent 
1. Profos Request 
2. Probe Response 
3. Autherrticatbn Request 
•#~™™ 4. AuthentE^tton Responss 
5. Association Request — 
S. Asociatbn Response jtecesB Point 
Wired 
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Figure 4: 802.11 Open Authentication Process 
II. b. Shared Key Authentication 
Shared key authentication is the second mode of authentication specified in the 802.11 
standard. Shared key authentication uses a standard challenge and response along with a shared 
secret key to provide authentication. If the authentication is successful, then the client 
(initiator) and the responder switch roles and repeat the process to ensure mutual 
authentication. Shared key authentication requires that the client configure a static WEP key. 
Figure 5 describes the shared key authentication process. 
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1. The client sends an authentication request to the access point requesting shared key 
authentication 
2. The access point responds with an authentication response containing challenge text 
3. The client uses its locally configured WEP key to encrypt the challenge text and reply 
with a subsequent authentication request 
4. If the access point can decrypt the authentication request and retrieve the original 
challenge text, then it responds with an authentication response that grants the client 
access 
- 4 **utw«tote«P«S!^»we<§4»:i»« 
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WEP Key 123458 
wired 
Figure 5: Shared Key Authentication Process 
The format of an authentication management frame is shown in figure 6. The format shown is 
used for all authentication messages. The value of the status code field is set to zero when 
successful, and to an error value if unsuccessful. The element identifier identifies that the 
challenge text is included. The length field identifies the length of the challenge text and is 
fixed at 128. The challenge text includes the random challenge string. 
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Figure 6: Authentication Management Frame 
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III. MAC Address Authentication 
MAC address authentication is not specified in the 802.11 standard, but many vendors support 
it. MAC address authentication verifies the client's MAC address against a locally configured 
list of allowed addresses or against an external authentication server (Figure 7). MAC 
authentication is used to augment the open and shared key authentications provided by 802.11, 
further reducing the likelihood of unauthorized devices accessing the network (CISCO 2007). 
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Figure 7: MAC Address Authentication Process 
1.4.2 802.11 Authentication Vulnerabilities 
I. Use of SSID 
The SSID is advertised in plain-text in the access point beacon messages (Figure 8). Although 
beacon messages are transparent to users, an eavesdropper can easily determine the SSID with 
the use of an 802.11 wireless LAN packet analyzer, like Sniffer Pro. Some access-point 
vendors offer the option to disable SSID broadcasts in the beacon messages. The SSID can still 
be determined by sniffing the probe response frames from an access point (Figure 9). 
vmmmmmmmmmummmmmmam 
illli 11! I i IS I l»#«fcs s s » ^  «-^ -l^ a M 
%&)>SK' 
Figure 8: SSID in an Access Point Beacon Frame 
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Figure 9: SSID in an Access Point Probe Response Frame 
The SSID is not designed, nor intended for use, as a security mechanism. In addition, disabling 
SSID broadcasts might have adverse effects on Wi-Fi interoperability for mixed-client 
deployments. 
II. Open Authentication Vulnerabilities 
Open authentication provides no way for the access point to determine whether a client is 
valid. This is major security vulnerability if WEP encryption is not implemented in a wireless 
LAN. It is not recommended to deploy wireless LANs without WEP encryption. 
III. Shared Key Authentication Vulnerabilities 
Shared key authentication requires the client use a pre-shared WEP key to encrypt challenge 
text sent from the access point. The access point authenticates the client by decrypting the 
shared key response and validating that the challenge text is the same. The process of 
exchanging the challenge text occurs over the wireless link and is vulnerable to a man-in-the-
middle attack. An eavesdropper can capture both the plain-text challenge text and the cipher-
text response. WEP encryption is done by performing an exclusive OR (XOR) function on the 
plain-text with the key stream to produce the cipher-text. It is important to note that if the XOR 
function is performed on the plain-text and cipher-text are XORed, the result is the key stream. 
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Therefore, an eavesdropper can easily derive the key stream just by sniffing the shared key 
authentication process with a protocol analyzer (Figure 10). 
Figure 10: Vulnerability of Shared Key Authentication 
IV. MAC Address Authentication Vulnerabilities 
MAC addresses are sent in the clear as required by the 802.11 specification. As a result, in 
wireless LANs that use MAC authentication, a network attacker might be able to subvert the 
MAC authentication process by "spoofing" a valid MAC address. MAC address spoofing is 
possible in 802.11 network interface cards (NICs) that allow the universally administered 
address (UAA) to be overwritten with a locally administered address (LAA). A network 
attacker can use a protocol analyzer to determine a valid MAC address in the business support 
system (BSS) and an LAA-compliant NIC with which to spoof the valid MAC address. 
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1.5. INTRUSION ANAL YSIS 
Intrusion detection is the art of detecting inappropriate, incorrect, or anomalous activity in 
order to respond to external attacks as well as internal misuse of computer system. It discovers 
violations of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and resources. Intrusion 
detection demands as much information as the computing resources can possibly collect and 
store. It needs constant improvement of technologies and processes to match pace of Internet 
innovation. Intrusion can provide digital forensic data to support post-compromise law 
enforcement actions. It can identify host and network wrong-configuration, improve 
management and customer understanding of the Internet's inherent hostility. Also, it is able to 
learn how hosts and networks operate at the operating system and protocol levels. 
In the wireless sensor network, the stream source would be a remote sensor that monitors the 
airwaves and generates a stream of 802.11 frame data as input to the analysis mechanism. 
Since wireless attacks occur before data is on the wired network, it is important for the source 
of the event stream to have access to the airwaves before the Access Point (AP) receives the 
data. The analysis mechanism can consist of one or more components based on any of several 
intrusion detection models. False positives, where the IDS generates an alarm when the threat 
did not actually exist, severely hamper the credibility of the IDS. In the same manner, false 
negatives, where the IDS did not generate an alarm and a threat did exist, degrade the 
reliability of the IDS. 
Signature based techniques produce accurate results but can be limited to historical attack 
patterns. Relying solely on manual signature-based techniques would only be as good as the 
latest known attack signature until the next signature update. Vendors who provide managed 
services, claim that they can write the updates to new attacks within hours and update the 
signature database in the client premises over the Internet. Anomaly detection techniques can 
detect unknown attacks by analyzing normal traffic patterns of the network but are less 
accurate than the signature-based techniques. A multi-dimensional intrusion detection 
approach integrates intrusion detection models that combine anomaly and signature-based 
techniques with policy deviation and state analysis. 
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1.5.1. Intrusion Detection for Traditional Network 
All computer activity and network traffic fall in one of three categories, including normal, 
abnormal but not malicious, and malicious. Properly classifying these events is the single most 
difficult problem, even more difficult than evidence collection. Two primary intrusion 
detection models are the Network-based intrusion detection and the Host-based intrusion 
detection. Network-based intrusion detection monitors network traffic for signs of misuse. 
Host-based intrusion detection monitors computer processes for signs of misuse. Systems are 
called "hybrid" systems if they do both. A hybrid IDS on a host may examine network traffic 
to or from the host, as well as processes on that host. 
Intrusion detection paradigms include the following: 
• Anomaly Detection 
• Misuse Detection 
Among all, anomaly detection and misuse detection are the most common traditional intrusion 
detection techniques. The following are summaries of the two techniques: 
Anomaly Detection 
An Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection System, is a system for detecting computer intrusions 
and misuse by monitoring system activity and classifying it as either normal or anomalous. 
The classification is based on heuristics or rules, rather than patterns or signatures, and will 
detect any type of misuse that falls out with normal system operation. In order to determine 
what attack traffic is, the system must be taught to recognize normal system activity. The 
anomaly detector observes the activity of subjects and generates profiles for them that 
represent their behavior. The audit records are processed, the system periodically generates a 
value that is a measure of the abnormality of the profile. This value is a function of the 
abnormality values of all the measures comprising the profile. The advantage of anomaly 
intrusion detection is that well-studied techniques in statistics can often be applied. For 
example, data points that lie beyond a multiple of the standard deviation on either side of the 
mean might be considered anomalous. The integral of the absolute difference of two functions 
over time might also be used as an indicator of the deviation of one function with respect to the 
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other. The greatest disadvantage of anomaly detection is that it is difficult to determine 
thresholds above which an anomaly should be considered intrusive. Setting a threshold too low 
results in false positives and setting it too high results in false negatives. 
Misuse Intrusion 
Misuse intrusion detection refers to the detection of intrusions by precisely defining them 
ahead of time and watching for their occurrence. Misuse detection is also sometimes referred to 
as signature-based detection because alarms are generated based on specific attack signatures. 
These attack signatures specify the features, conditions, arrangements and interrelationships 
among events that lead the system to a break-in or other intrusive activity. Signatures are not 
only useful to detect intrusions but also attempted intrusions. A partial satisfaction of a 
signature may indicate an intrusion attempt. A misuse intrusion detector that simply flags 
intrusions based on the pattern of input events assumes that the state transition of the system 
leads to a compromised state when exercised with the intrusion pattern, regardless of the initial 
state of the system. One of the major advantages of misuse detection system is that user can 
examine the signature database, and quickly determine which intrusive activity the misuse 
detection system is programmed to alert on. One of the biggest problems is maintaining state 
information for signatures in which the intrusive activity encompasses multiple discrete events 
(that is, the complete attack signature occurs in multiple packets on the network). Another 
drawback is that your misuse detection system must have a signature defined for all of the 
possible attacks that an attacker may launch against your system. This leads to the necessity for 
frequent signature updates to keep the signature database of your misuse detection system up-
to-date. 
1.5.1.1. Intrusion Classification for Traditional (Wired) Network 
According to (Bai and Kobayashi 2003), primarily there are four kinds of intrusions: 
1. User to Root Attack (U2R) 
2. Remote to User Attack (R2U) 
3. Denial of Service Attack (DoS) 
4. Probes Attack (Probes) 
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The most severe attacks are categorized as U2R and the order of severity can be organized as 
U2R > R2U > DoS > Probes. According to research it is found that current data mining based 
IDSs are more useful on capturing DoS and Probes attacks than capturing U2R and R2U 
attacks (Ezeife et al. 2008). 
1. User to Roof Attack: 
This category consists of attacks where a local user on a machine is able to obtain privileges 
normally reserved for the UNIX super user or the Windows NT administrator. The intruder 
exploits some software vulnerabilities to gain root access. Examples of U2R attack are Eject 
and Fbconfig (Radosavac and Baras 2003). The most common User to Root attack is buffer 
overflow attack, which enables the attacker to run personal code on a target machine once the 
boundary of a buffer has been exceeded, giving him the privileges of the overflowed program 
(which in most cases is root). This type of attack usually tries to execute a shell with the 
application's owner privileges. Some examples of those attacks are eject, ffbconfig etc 
(Radosavac and Baras 2003). 
2. Remote to User Attack: 
In this type of attack, the attacker does not have any user account in the victim system. By 
exploiting some software vulnerabilities and sending network packets, the user gain normal 
access and later he can launch U2R attack and gain root access. An example of this kind of 
attack is Sendmail attack. The Sendmail attack exploits a buffer overflow in UNIX version 
8.8.3 of sendmail and allows a remote attacker to execute commands with superuser privileges. 
By sending a carefully crafted email message to a system running a vulnerable version of 
sendmail, intruders can force sendmail to execute arbitrary commands with root privilege. 
According to (Lincoln Laboratory MIT 2007), in this type of attack, the attacker sends a 
carefully constructed mail message with a long MIME header field. Sendmail daemon 
overflows during MIME processing and adds a new entry to the password file. Attacker comes 
back later and finds that his mail message has given him a root account on the victim system. 
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3. Denial of Service Attack (DoS): 
DoS is a type of attack on a network that is designed to bring the network down by flooding it 
with useless traffic. Although a DoS attack does not usually result in the theft of information or 
other security loss, it can cost the target person or company a great deal of time and money. 
Typically, the loss of service is the inability of a particular network service, such as e-mail, to 
be available or the temporary loss of all network connectivity and services. A denial of service 
attack can also destroy programming and files in affected computer systems. In some cases, 
DoS attacks have forced Web sites accessed by millions of people to temporarily cease 
operation. Examples of this kind of attack are SYN flood attack, Teardrop attack, Smurf attack 
etc (Lincoln Laboratory 2007). 
4. Probes Attack: 
Probes attack itself does not do anything other than scanning all reachable ports of computers 
in a network, gathers information, and looks for security holes in the network. Later this 
information can be used to launch other types of attacks and cause more damage to the 
network. Examples of this kind of scanning tools are Ipsweep, Mscan etc (Ezeife et al. 2008). 
An Ipsweep attack is a surveillance sweep termine which hosts are listening on a network. 
There are many methods an attacker can use to perform an Ipsweep attack. The most common 
method is to send ICMP Ping packets to every possible address within a subnet and wait to see 
which machines respond (Lincoln Laboratory 2007). Then, the attacker can determine which 
ports on which machines are open and then he can plan to launch other attacks through those 
open ports. 
1.5.1.2. Types of Attacks in Wireless Sensor Network: 
Wireless sensor network is vulnerable to different kinds of attacks. In this section we will look 
at the various kinds of WSN attacks as follows: 
/ . MAC Address Spoofing: 
IEEE 802.11 has as a 48-bit MAC address in the same format as an IEEE 802.3 address and 
similar to an Ethernet address. The 802.11 address is similar to the Ethernet's in both format 
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and security. Since there is no validation of address, one can spoof addresses. Since almost all 
wireless NICs permit changing their MAC address to an arbitrary value through vendor-
supplied drivers, open-source drivers or various application programming frameworks, it is 
trivial for an attacker to wreak havoc on a target wireless LAN. When an attacker changes 
his/her MAC address they continue to utilize the wireless card for its intended layer 2 
transport, transmitting and receiving from the same source MAC. A common example is an 
attacker executing a brute-force attack script with a random MAC address for each successive 
connection attempt. This kind of attack would go undetected by network activity analysis 
applications that report upper-layer network activity or large quantities of traffic from a single 
source of address (Wight 2003). 
2. Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Poisoning: 
When data are sent out onto a network, they need a way to find the destination. This is 
accomplished on several layers, depending on how far the data need to travel. At the first layer, 
there exists an address called the MAC address. This theoretically 100% unique vale is 
systematically assigned to each and every network device that is produced. In other words, 
every network card, router, and switch has a pseudo-serial number that distinguishes it from 
every other network device in the world. However, the MAC address is used only to 
communicate within local networking segments, which are called subnets. Once the data pass 
through a router or switch to another network subnet, the next layer of addressing becomes 
important. This is because the database is required to record every MAC address and its 
location would be too large for quick processing. Instead, other technologies, such as DNS, 
WINS, IP manage data flow the farther out the data travels. To facilitate this transmission of 
data, ARP was designed to act as the intermediary between IP and MAC addresses. 
ARP is responsible for managing the relationship between MAC addresses and the IP 
addresses for network devices. This fundamental technology is part of the core of Internet 
functionality. In fact, without it a network will fail to work. However, it has been discovered 
that ARP information can be spoofed, or faked, to facilitate the control of all network data. The 
MAC address to IP address table is usually stored locally on each computer. This helps speed 
up data transfer because the MAC address doesn't have to be verified each and every time a 
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device wants to communicate with another device. However, this advantage has a negative 
side. By storing the MAC addresses in the ARP table, a potential weakness arises. A remote 
hacker could control an ARP table of a computer and could change MAC to IP address entries, 
which could cause traffic to be redirected from the correct target to a target of the hacker's 
choice (Wight 2003). 
3. Deauthentication: 
Any wireless client must first authenticate itself to the AP before further communication may 
commence. The authentication framework is a message that allows clients and access points to 
explicitly request deauthenticaiton from one another. Unfortunately, this message itself is not 
authenticated using any key material. Consequently the attacker may spoof this message, either 
pretending to be the access point or the client, and direct it to the other party. In response, the 
access point or client will exit the authenticated state and will refuse all further packets until 
authentication is reestablished (Bellardo and Savage 2003). 
4. Man-in-the middle attacks: 
Placing a rogue AP (Access Point) within range of wireless stations is wireless-specific 
variation of a man-in-the-middle attack. If the attacker knows the SSID in use by the network 
(which is easily discoverable) and the rogue AP has enough strength, wireless users will have 
no way of knowing that they are connecting to an unauthorized AP. Using a rogue AP, an 
attacker can gain valuable information about the wireless network, such as authentication 
requests, the secret key that may be in use, and so on. Often, the attacker will set up a laptop 
with two wireless adaptors, in which one card is used by the rogue AP and the other is used to 
forward requests through a wireless bridge to the legitimate AP. With a sufficiently strong 
antenna, the rogue AP does not have to be located in close proximity to the legitimate AP. So, 
for example, the attacker can run the rogue AP from a car or van parked some distance away 
from the building. However, it is also common to set up hidden rogue APs (under desks, in 
closets, etc.) close to and within the same physical area as the legitimate AP. Because of their 
undetectable nature, the only defense against rogue APs is vigilance through frequent site 
surveys using tools such as Netstumbler (Robert 2004) and AiroPeek (Wild Packets 2007), and 
physical security. 
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5. Disassociation: 
Since a client may be authenticated with multiple access points at once, the 802.11 standard 
provides a special association message to allow the client and access point to agree which 
access point shall have responsibility for forwarding packets to and from the wired network on 
the client's behalf. As with authentication, association frames are unauthenticated, and 802.11 
provides a disassociation message similar to the deauthentication message described earlier. 
Exploiting this vulnerability is functionally identical to the deauthentication attack. However, it 
is worth noting that the disassociation attack is slightly less efficient than the deauthentication 
attack. This is because deauthentication forces the victim node to do more work to return to the 
associated state that does disassociation, ultimately requiring less work on the part of the attack 
(Bellardo and Savage 2003). 
6. Wormhole Attack: 
The wormhole (Kwok 2003) attack is possible even if the attack has not compromised any 
host, and even if all communication provides authenticity and confidentiality. In the wormhole 
attack, an attacker records packets at one location in the network, tunnels them to another 
location, and retransmits the packets into the network at the later location. The wormhole 
attack can form a serious threat in wireless networks, especially against many ad-hoc network 
routing protocols and location based wireless security systems. Wireless security protocol 
based on localization have the potential to detect wormhole attacks. Localization systems are 
based on verifying the relative locations of nodes in a wireless network. Knowing the relative 
location may help conclude whether or not packets are sent from a node or a wormhole. 
7. Network Injection Attack: 
The network injection attack is a kind of DoS attack which exploits improperly configured 
wireless LANs or rogue access points to target the entire network. When an access point is 
attached to an unfiltered part of the enterprise network, it broadcasts network traffic, such as 
"Spanning Tree" (802.ID), OSPF, RIP, HSRP (CISCO 2007) and other broadcast or multicast 
traffic. By doing this, the packets invite attacks that take down wireless and wired network 
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equipment and spur a meltdown of the entire internal network infrastructure, including hubs, 
switches and routers. 
8. RTS/CTS Flood: 
Request to Send and Clear to Send flood are like SYN flood in TCP for wired network (Hu et 
al. 2003). In SYN-flood attack, SYN packet is sent to target and target returns an ACK packet 
to cause a half-open connection. If the attacker keeps sending SYN packets it can cause a DoS 
attack till timeouts occur. Similarly in 802.11, a flood of RTS packets can lead to DoS attack 
since only a finite number of connections can be open at any given time. 
9. Jamming attacks: 
Jamming is a special kind of DoS attack specific to wireless networks. Jamming occurs when 
spurious RF (Radio Frequency) frequencies interfere with the operation of the wireless 
network. In some cases, the jamming is not malicious and is caused by the presence of other 
devices, such as cordless phones, that operate in the same frequency as the wireless network. 
In a case like this, the administrator must devise and implement policies regarding the use of 
these devices or choose wireless hardware that uses different frequencies. Intentional and 
malicious jamming occurs when an attacker analyzes the spectrum being used by wireless 
networks and then transmits a powerful signal to interfere with communication on the 
discovered frequencies. Fortunately, this kind of attack is not very common because of the 
expense of acquiring hardware capable of launching jamming attacks. Plus, jamming a 
network represents a kind of Pyrrhic victory for the attacker since it leads to a lot of time and 
effort being expended merely to disable communications for a while (Rahman 2008). 
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2. Related Works Using Data Mining Techniques: 
From the data centric point of view, we can consider intrusion as a data analysis process. 
Anomaly detection is about finding normal usage patterns from audit data, whereas misuse 
detection is about finding the patterns of intrusion, and then using these patterns to inspect 
audit data. Audit data can be obtained from many sources. Using these audit data we can 
implement data mining approach to wireless network intrusion detection which provides an 
opportunity to learn the behaviors of network users' activity. To gain insight into the overall 
distribution patterns and interesting correlations among sensor network attributes, different 
researchers have used different data mining approaches. Association, Classification and 
Clustering: three methods of data mining have been used largely in the field of network 
intrusion detection from the very beginning (Ma et al. 2004; Rahman 2008). Among them 
Association rule was the widely used technique in many models including ADAM (Barbara et 
al. 2001), MADAM ID (Lee and Stolfo 2000), LERAD (Mahoney and Chan 2003), MINDS 
(Ertoz et al. 2004) etc. We have investigated several research papers of various researchers 
who used different model names which have been implemented to different data mining 
techniques as follows: 
2.1. Association Rule Concept: 
An association rule is mainly a mathematical rule of the form {A,} -> {By} which is found 
useful in data mining based NIDS (Ezeife et al. 2008). In the database, the association between 
data items (e.g., A/, By) means that we can infer that particular data item (e.g., By) is in 
existence because of the appearance of some data items (e.g., A,) in a transaction. Association 
rule mining is used to discover correlation relationships among items in transaction data. An 
example of transaction data from a bookstore is shown in table 1. 
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Transaction ID (TID) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Items 
book, paper, pencil 
file, pen, pencil 
file, paper, pen, pencil 
file, pen 
Table 1: Sample Transaction data 
Let us discuss the association rule in a mathematical form. Here are some standard definitions 
of association rule related terms from (Dunham 2003; Ezeife et al. 2008): 
Given a set of items / = {Ij, I2, , lmj and a database of transactions D = {tj, t2, , t„} where 
ti = {In, la, ..... Iikj and Iy el, an association rule is an implication of the formX -> Y where X, 
Y czl are sets of items called itemsets and X nY = 0. 
The support for an association ruleX -> Fis the percentage of transactions in the database that 
contain X u Y. The support parameter can be used to determine how often the rule is applied. 
The confidence or strength for an association rule X -> Y is the ratio of the number of 
transactions that contain X u Y to the number of transactions that contain X. The confidence 
parameter can be used to determine how often the rule is correct. 
For example, using table 1, the itemset / = {book, file, paper, pen, pencil}. We can find that 
{file, pen} occurs in transaction 2, 3 and 4. So, if we make a rule Mkefile ->pen, the support of 
this rule will be 3/4*100% = 75%, which means 75% of all customers buy both items. 
The confidence of the rule file -> pen will be the ratio of the number of transactions that 
contain {file, pen} to the number of transactions that contain {file}. Transaction number 2, 3 
and 4 contain {file, pen} and transaction number 2, 3 and 4 contain {file}. So, confidence of 
this rule would be 3/3*100% = 100%, that means 100% of customers who buy file also buy 
pen, meaning the rule has 100% accuracy. 
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Through next several sub-sections we will discuss two important Association Rule Mining 
algorithms: Apriori, FP-growth algorithm and frequent episode rules, which are commonly 
used for Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS). 
2.1.1. NIDS Using Association-Rule Mining: 
Association-rule mining finds interesting association or correlation relationships among a large 
sets of data items. With massive amounts of data continuously being collected and stored, the 
discovery of interesting association relationships among huge amount of transaction records 
can help in making decisions (Han and Kamber 2001). A well known example is market basket 
analysis. It analyzes customer buying habits by finding association between the different items 
that customer place in their shopper baskets. If most customers who buy milk also buy bread, 
then we can put milk and bread oh the same shelf to increase the profit. Here we will examine 
a few researchers' approaches using association rules in intrusion detection system for wired 
networks which may provide the conception of its implementation in wireless sensor networks. 
2.1.1.1 ADAM 
In (Barbara et al. 2001) the authors present an architecture of data mining based intrusion 
system ADAM (Audit Data Analysis and Mining). In ADAM they use a combination of 
association rules to detect any attack in a TCP Dump audit trails. ADAM is developed at 
George Mason University of USA. They introduce the approach that any event flagged by the 
association rules module that cannot be classified as a known attack or as a normal event (false 
alarm) by the classifier, ought to be considered, conservatively, as an unknown attack. Using 
this assumption, authors change the label in the classifier from "default" to "unknown". 
First, ADAM collects normal, known frequent datasets by mining into this model. Secondly, it 
runs an on-line algorithm to find last frequent connections and compare them with the known 
mined data and discards those which seem to be normal. With the suspicious ones it then uses a 
classifier which is previously trained to classify the suspicious connections as a known type of 
attack, unknown type of attack or a false alarm. There are two phases in this experimental 
model. In the first phase they trained the classifier. This phase takes place only once offline 
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before using the system. In the second phase they use the trained classifier to detect intrusions. 
The algorithm with example [Rahman 2008] is described below. 
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Figure 11: Training phase of ADAM 
Phase 1: 
In the first phase, attack free normal frequent datasets are used to build a normal 
profile, where a minimum support is specified. For example, we have a database 
consisting of attack free connections. The schema of the database is shown in Table 2. 
Time stamp Source IP Source Port Destination IP Destination port Flag Service 
Table 2: Schema of attack free database to be used to build attack free normal profile 
Now suppose for some specified minimum support (for instance 60%) we collect only 
those connections those have a support greater than the minimum support. And we 
build a profile of normal connections. For example, the normal profile might be like 
table 3. 
Time stamp 
TO 
Tl 
Source IP 
137.207.34.1 
137.207.34.1 
Source Port 
80 
25 
Destination IP 
168.212.22.3 
207.34.56.2 
Destination port 
80 
25 
Flag 
ACK 
ACK 
Service 
http 
telnet 
Table 3: Sample of normal profile 
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• Then in the second step again training data and the already built normal profile are used 
with an online algorithm of tunable size. From the training data, association rules are 
generated in the form of X-> Y. Suppose, in some specified period of time a rule 
(src_IP = 137.207.34.1, src_port = 80 -> service = http) is getting strong support. 
Then this rule will be checked in the normal profile, if the rule is present then it will be 
ignored. In this case it will be ignored since it matches with the normal profile. But for 
instance, if we see that a rule {destJP = 137.207.34.1, destjport = 80 ->flag = SYN) 
(which is actually a signature of SYN flood attack) is getting strong support within a 
specified time window and this does not match with any normal profile data, a counter 
is used to track the support that the itemset received. If the support crosses the 
threshold, then it will be reported as suspicious. 
Then the features of the raw data corresponding to these suspicious itemsets are located and 
used to train the classifier by classifying them as false alarms or attacks. 
Phase 2: 
• In this phase, the classifier is already trained and can categorize any attack as known or 
false alarm. The attacks that are not specified in the classifier are labeled as unknown 
attacks. Here, also the same dynamic on-line algorithm is used to produce suspicious 
data with the help of normal profile and trained classifier. If it is false alarm then the 
classifier excludes those from the attack list and does not send those to system 
monitoring officer. 
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Figure 12: Discovering intrusions with ADAM 
The authors used DARPA 1999 datasets in their experiment. The authors claimed that ADAM 
is very successful in detecting DOS, PROBE, U2L attack but their system could not detect 
U2R attacks. The main deficiency in the approach is that they used only association rules and 
as a result their classifier generated a lot of rules, among them many were redundant. Another 
weakness of ADAM is that it totally depends on attack free normal training data, which are 
difficult to get. 
2.1.1.2. MINDS 
In (Ertoz et al. 2004) the authors present MINDS (Minnesota Intrusion Detection System) 
which was developed at the department of computer science in University of Minnesota. To the 
best of our knowledge MINDS is one of the best unsupervised anomaly detection system 
which is based on statistical approaches, clustering, outlier detection schemes etc. In this paper 
the authors have presented an unsupervised anomaly detection technique that assigns a score to 
each network connection that reflects how anomalous the connection is, and an association 
pattern analysis based module that summarizes those network connections that are ranked 
highly anomalous by the anomaly detection module. The brief workflow of the MINDS 
[Rahman 2008] is as follows: 
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Figure 13: MINDS System 
Input: 
Input to the MINDS is Netflow version 5 data collected using flow tool (for details refer to 
(www.splintered.net/sw/flow-tools) which is an alternative to tcpDump data. Flow-tools only 
capture packet header information, not the message contents. Just like tcp dump data header 
information contains source ip, source port, destination ip, destination port, time stump, flag 
values, duration of the connection etc. They have used 10 minutes time window. All data in the 
internet are passed as packets. All these packets have some header information and data. The 
system only captures the header information for all of those packets that have passed in last 10 
minutes. Those data are stored and before they are fed into the main system a data filtering step 
is performed to remove network traffic that the analyst is not interested in analyzing. For 
example, filtered data may include traffic from trusted sources. For example, in University of 
Windsor, when an access request to port numbers between 40000 and 60000 comes from 
UofW campus network it is granted, otherwise if the source IP is not from the university 
network, the access is denied. More precisely, if somebody tries to access port 40001 with 
http://cs.uwindsor.ca:40001 from home, then the request is denied but is granted if the request 
is coming from university lab computers. 
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Step 1: Feature Construction 
The first step in MINDS main system is "feature extraction". The data are in the binary format 
but we know the format (which bytes are representing what) and we extract those basic 
features from the audit data. These basic features include source and destination IP address, 
source and destination ports, protocol, flags, number of bytes and number of packets. With 
these basic features then derived features are computed. There are two types of derived 
features, (1) time window based features and (2) connection window based features. Time 
window based features are constructed to capture connections with similar characteristics 
within the last T seconds. For example, how many connections were destined towards the same 
destination IP address in last T seconds is called count-dest. Connection window based features 
are constructed to capture connection with similar characteristics within last N connection. For 
example, within last N connection how many connections were destined towards the same 
destination IP address is called count-dest-conn. Sample features of both type features are 
presented below in table 4 and table 5. 
Feature 
name 
count-dest 
count-src 
count-serv-
src 
count-serv-
dest 
Feature Description 
Number of flows to unique destination IP address inside the network in the last 
T seconds from the same source 
Number of flows from unique source IP addresses inside the network in the last 
T seconds to the same destination 
Number of flows from the source IP to the same destination port in last T 
seconds 
Number of flows from the destination IP address using same source port in last 
T seconds 
Table 4: Time-window based features 
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Feature name 
count-dest-conn 
count-src-conn 
count-serv-src-
conn 
count-serv-dest-
conn 
Feature Description 
Number of flows to unique destination IP address inside the network in the 
last N flows from the same source 
Number of flows from unique source IP addresses inside the network in the 
last N flows to the same destination 
Number of flows from the source IP to the same destination port in last N 
flows 
Number of flows from the destination IP address using same source port in 
last N flows 
Table 5: Connection-window based features 
Step 2: Known Attack Detection 
After all features of connection have been derived then the next step is to compare those 
features with known anomalies. If it finds a match then it directly send it to the analysts. 
For example, suppose it is known from time-window based features that one single source IP is 
trying to access the same port in many destination IPs many times within the last 3 seconds and 
if there is existing signature of this kind of attack then it can be sent to analyst as an attack 
without any hesitation. Now if there is no known attack signature of this kind then we send that 
connection record to Anomaly Detection module, which will be the next step. 
Step 3: Anomaly Detection 
In this step Anomaly Detection module will use an outlier detection algorithm to assign an 
anomaly score to each network connection. It assigns a degree of being an outlier to each data 
point, which is called Local Outlier Factor (LOF) (Breunig et al. 2000). For each data example, 
the density of the neighborhood is first computed. The LOF of a specific data example p 
represents the average of the ratios of the density of the example p and the density of its 
neighbors. LOF requires the neighborhood of all data points be constructed. This involves 
calculating pairwise distances between all data points, which is 0(n2) complexity. As there 
could be a million data sets, the complexity will be huge. To reduce the complexity an 
34 
approach has been taken in MINDS. They have made a sample dataset from the data and all 
data points are compared with the small set, which reduces the complexity to 0(n*m), where m 
is the size of small dataset. 
Figure 14: Local Outlier Factor (LOF) approach 
For example, in the figure 17 we can see that cluster C2 is denser than CI. Due to the low 
density in cluster CI, for most examples q inside CI, the distance between any dataset and its 
neighbor is greater than that of CI. For example, the distance between pi and p3 is higher than 
the distance between p2 and p4. So, therefore p2 will not be considered as outlier. 
Step 4: Association Pattern Analysis 
After assigning each connection a score then top 10% scores are taken as anomaly class and 
bottom 30% scores are taken as normal class. Middle 60% scores are ignored in their system. 
Then, these scored connections are passed into the Association Pattern Generator. 
This module summarizes network connections that are ranked highly anomalous by the 
anomaly detection module. The goal of mining association patterns is to discover patterns that 
occur frequently in anomaly class or in normal class. In this step they have applied association 
rule to construct rulesets for anomaly class and for normal class. For example, scanning 
activity for a particular service can be summarized by a frequent set: 
sourceIP=X, destinationPort=Y 
If most of the connections in the frequent set are ranked high by previous step, then this 
frequent set may be a candidate signature for addition to a signature-based system. Or, if the 
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following frequent set is scored lower and appeared many times then we can say it is normal 
which is a web browsing activity. The web browsing activity can be summarized as a frequent 
rule set: 
Protocol=TCP, destinationPort=80, NumPackets=3.. .6 
Then, in the last step summary of all rules are presented in front of analyst and then analyst can 
update or build normal profile or can label a new attack signatures. This is how the MINDS 
woks as an unsupervised anomaly detection system. One limitation of MINDS is that it only 
analyzes the header parts of data and does not pay attention to payload. As a result, U2R or 
R2U attacks may go undetected in their system. 
2.2. Cluster Analysis Concept: 
Clustering is a major data mining technique which is widely used in network intrusion 
detection purposes. Clustering is a process of partitioning a set of data or objects into groups of 
similar objects. Each group, called cluster, consists of objects that are similar among 
themselves and dissimilar to objects of other groups. 
Traditionally, clustering techniques are broadly divided in hierarchical and partitioning 
(Berkhin 2003). Hierarchical clustering is further subdivided into agglomerative and divisive. 
While hierarchical algorithms build clusters gradually (as crystals are grown), partitioning 
algorithms learn clusters directly. In doing so, they either try to discover clusters by iteratively 
relocating points between subsets, or try to identify clusters as areas highly populated with data 
(Berkhin 2003). In this section we will discuss a popular clustering algorithm, K-means 
clustering, which falls under partitioning clustering method. 
K-Means Clustering: 
The K-means algorithm takes the input parameter, k, and partitions a set of n objects into k 
clusters so that the resulting intra-cluster (objects within the same cluster) similarity is high but 
the inter-cluster similarity (objects residing in different clusters) is low. Cluster similarity is 
measured with regards to the mean value of the objects in a cluster, which can be viewed as the 
cluster's center of gravity. 
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Algorithm: &-means. The &-means algorithm for partitioning based or 
objects 
Input: 
in the cluster. 
The number of clusters k and a database containing n objects. 
Output: A set of k clusters that minimizes the squared-error criterion. 
Method: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
arbitrary choose k objects as the initial cluster centers; 
repeat 
(re)assign each object to the cluster to which the object is 
based on the mean value of the objects in the cluster; 
i the mean value of the 
the most similar, 
update the cluster means, i.e., calculate the mean value of the objects for 
each cluster; 
until no changes; 
Figure 15: K-Means algorithm 
For example, we have 5 datasets in two 2-dimensional spaces. The sample input data is 
described in figure 16 and the number of cluster, k, is 2. 
Data Point 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Array 1 
22 
19 
18 
1 
4 
Array 2 
21 
20 
22 
3 
2 
Figure 16: Sample dataset for K-Means algorithm 
Initially, we choose two arbitrary centre points (18,22) and (4,2) as centroids for Ci (cluster 1) 
and C2 (cluster 2). To determine the Euclidean distance of a dataset P = (Pi, P2, . . . , Pn) from a 
centroid Q = (Qi, Q2, . . . , Qn), the formula is: 
\j{p\ - qi)2 + (P2 - ga)2 + • • • + (Pn - qnf = A J2(Pi - qi}2-
\h=i 
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Iteration 1: 
We will have to check the Euclidean distance of every point (e.g., 22,21)from both centroids 
Ci(18,22) and C2(4,2) and the point will be assigned to the cluster it has lowest distance with. 
For Point 1,(22,21): 
Distance from centroid C,: V{(22-18)2 + (21-22)2} = Vl7 = 4.12 
Distance from centroid C2: V{(22-4)2 + (21-2)2} = A/6517 = 80.72 
So, point 1 is assigned to C|. 
In the same way point 2 and point 3 are assigned to Cj and point 4 and point 5 are assigned to 
C2. 
So, Cluster 1, d = {point 1, point 2, point 3} = {(22,21), (19,20), (18,22)} 
Cluster 2, C2 = {point 4, point 5} = {(1,3), (4,2)} 
Now, we calculate the new centroids for the clusters. 
New centroid for Cx: {(22,21) + (19,20) + (18,22)} / 3 = (20,21) 
New centroid for C2: {(1,3) + (4,2)} / 2 = (3,3) 
Iteration 2: 
We will have to check the distance of every point from both centroids and the point will be 
assigned to the cluster it has lowest distance with. 
For Point 1,(22,21): 
Distance from C,: V{(22-20)2 + (21-21)2} = 2 
Distance from C2: V{(22-3)2 + (21-3)2} - V685 = 26.17 
So, point 1 is assigned to C\. 
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In the same way point 2 and point 3 are assigned to C\ and point 4 and point 5 are assigned to 
C2. 
So, Cluster 1, C, = {point 1, point 2, point 3} = {(22,21), (19,20), (18,22)} 
Cluster 2, C2 = {point 4, point 5} = {(1,3), (4,2)} 
Now, we calculate the new centroids for the clusters. 
New centroid for C,: {(22,21) + (19,20) + (18,22)} / 3 = (20,21) 
New centroid for C2: {(1,3) + (4,2)} / 2 = (3,3) 
Since the clusters and centroids remain unchanged, we will stop here. The final clusters will 
look like figure 17. 
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Figure 17: K-Means Example 
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2.2.1. NIDS Using Cluster Analysis 
The process of grouping a set of physical or abstract objects into classes of similar objects is 
called clustering. A cluster of data objects can be treated collectively as one group in many 
applications. By clustering, one can identify dense and sparse regions and discover overall 
distribution patterns and interesting correlations among data attributes using different 
algorithms. We found in our investigation that the researchers are highly motivated and 
clustering analysis can serve as a first step for other analysis or mining operations on the 
detected clusters and even performance tuning of the sensor networks. 
In the research paper (Khoshgoftaar et al. 2005), the authors extended their previous work by 
clustering wireless traffic data and use heuristics to label each instance as intrusion or normal. 
The authors identified the problems that there are security vulnerabilities of 802.11 wireless 
networks for leading to a summary of network traffic metrics relevant to modeling the security 
of wireless networks. The heuristics they used are similar to their previous work in which 
clusters are ordered according to the largest cluster and a percentage cutoff is used to determine 
the separation point between attacks and normal clusters. The assumption here is that the 
largest cluster will have normal instances whereas anomalous or intrusive instances would 
belong to clusters far away from the largest cluster. In their study they use a distance-based cut 
off instead percentage cutoff. They applied the online k-means clustering algorithm to the three 
datasets for three different maximum number of clusters, i.e., k = 15, 30, 50 clusters. Initially, 
all metrics were used during clustering with the numeric features scaled to [0,1] and the 
categorical features -day, time slot, and access point - represented by the 1-of-N encoding 
approach. This encoding increased the number of features to 178 dimensions. The clusters that 
are relatively farther from the largest clusters are usually small in size and could constitute as 
anomalies or intrusions. 
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CttSidriCe 
Figure 18: Distance to largest cluster 
The cluster distances from the largest cluster plotted against the log of cluster size is shown in 
Figure - 18. The figure aids in identifying the normal clusters according to our conservative 
assumption that very large clusters cannot be attacks. Their study also investigated the use of 
tracers (records with known normal or intrusive levels) to enhance intrusion detection 
performance. They showed that the small set of tracers can significantly improve the intrusion 
detection rate of their cluster-based approach. Authors claim that their approach is one of the 
first studies to investigate a tracer-based clustering approach with expert analysis for intrusion 
detection in WLANs. They suggested that the future studies can investigate using tracers to 
isolate different intrusion or attack types among the intrusive clusters. 
The input data (http://nms.lcs.mit.edu/~mbalazin/wireless) for their work was a wireless logs 
obtained from more than 170 access points spread over three buildings. The raw data was 
summarized into connection-oriented records by pairing up the Mac address that uniquely 
identifies the client with the access point to which it is connected. The wireless network used 
for data collection was operating in the infrastructure mode with clients connected via the 
access points. The following attributes in table 6 are used in their data collection process. 
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Site 
Day 
Moment 
AP_Name 
SysUpTime 
SnmpInPkts 
SnmpOutPkts 
Ipln 
IpOut 
IpFwd 
Tcpln 
TcpOut 
Udpln 
UdpOut 
string 
Date 
Time 
String 
Time 
Int 
Int 
Int 
Int 
Int 
Int 
Int 
Int 
Int 
Table 6: Data Collection Attributes 
K-Means is a widely used algorithm that minimizes the mean-squared error (MSE) objective 
function. K-means is popular algorithm due to its simplicity, low time complexity, and fast 
convergence (Khoshgoftaar et al. 2005). The authors have shown in their previous work 
(Khoshgoftaar et al. 2005) that Online K-means not only outperforms batch K-means in 
clustering quality but is also more efficient. 
After preprocessing the data they have applied the online K-means algorithm to find the 
clusters from the wireless log data. We will now explain their online K-mean algorithm with an 
example (Ejelike 2008). Following table 7 represents the input data. 
Site 
LBdg 
MBdg 
Day 
2.7.20 
2.7.20 
Moment 
00:05:07 
00:10:07 
AP 
API 
AP2 
SysUpTime 
3:1:57:12.0 
3:2:02:12.0 
SnmpInPkts 
523976 
524444 
SnmpOutPkts 
522317 
522783 
Ipln 
984212 
984744 
IpOut 
528030 
528498 
IpFwd 
0 
0 
Tcpln 
1911 
1911 
TcpOut 
1911 
1911 
Udpln 
523187 
523653 
UdpOut 
524183 
524649 
Table 7: Sample Input data for clustering 
We can only use numeric values for Clustering. Therefore the site and AP name attributes 
which are of string data type in the sample data have to be converted to numeric data type. The 
authors used 1-of-N encoding, which assigns the same weight to each category and requires as 
many numeric places as there are categories. For example, Site with 3 nominal values (LBldg, 
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MBldg, SBldg) would be assigned 100, 010, and 001 respectively. LBldgAP and MBldgAP 
will be assigned 200 and 020 respectively, and any other APname would be 002. 
Suppose our Input dataset has 4 dimensions and the cluster has 2 points L, M, and a centroid P; 
L = (Li, La, ... , L4),M = (M,, M2, .... , M4), and P = (P,,P2, ... , P4). Pi = (L,+Mi)/2, P2 = 
(L2+M2)/2, P3 = (L3+M3)/2, P4 = (L4+M4)/2. 
The cluster centroid is randomly selected, each point in the matrix is assigned to the nearest 
cluster center and then a new centroid for each cluster is recalculated using the new cluster 
member values. For example, we will use a simple sample dataset for easy calculation to show 
how the online K-Means algorithm works. Assuming we transform the sample input data in 
Table 8, to make use of only five attributes from the sample input as shown in following Table. 
Connection Record 
Coni 
Con2 
Attribute 1 
5 
6 
Attribute 2 
3 
6 
Attribute 3 
2 
3 
Attribute 4 
1 
1 
Table 8: Sample connection records for kmo algorithm 
Each record Coni, Con2 represents one point with 4 attributes. 
1. Initial value of centroids (Initialization): Let C| and C2 denote randomly selected 
centroids, with Ci = (3,3,3,3) and C2 = (2,2,2,2). We are using a cluster with 2 points, therefore 
our K (number of clusters) = 2. 
2. Objects-Centroids Distance: The distance between cluster centroid to each object is 
calculated using Euclidean distance. Then, distance matrix at iteration 0 will be 
E= J_S||Xn-Hyn||2 (1) 
N 
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Where y„ = arg min* \\x„ - |i J \ is the cluster identity of data vector x„ and [i^ is the centroid 
of cluster j„. II II represents L2 norm. 
Let L; and M, = Coni, Con2 respectively and since we want to cluster the connection records in 
two clusters Ci and C2, as shown in Figure 19 below; 
k 
5 
3 
2 
1 
^ 
6 
6 
3 
1 
Ci 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Ci 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Figure 19: Matrix representation of CI and C2 at 0 iteration 
Then the distances between the columns in Table 8 is calculated as follows using equation 1; 
d (L;, d ) = V{(5-3)2 + (3-3)2 + (2-3)2 + ( 1-3)2 } = ^9 = 3 
d (Mj, C ) - V {(6-3)2 + (6-3)2 + (3-3)2 + (1-3)2} = V22 = 4.69 
d (Li,C2) = V{(5-2)2 + (3-2)2 + (2-2)2 + ( 1-2)2 }= yjn = 3.32 
d (Mj, C2) = V {(6-2)2 + (6-2)2 + (3-2)2 + (1-2)2 }= ^34 = 5.83 
Do represents distance at iteration 0, therefore our matrix at iteration 0 for the instance Ci is: 
D0 = [3 4.69] 
3. Objects clustering: The difference between online K-Means and normal K-Means is 
that, normal K-Means will assign all instances (connection records) to a cluster and then update 
the centroid. But, with online K-Means centroid is updated after assigning each instance to a 
cluster. The aim is to move the cluster point closer to the vector instance. Based on the 
minimum distance, Coni is assigned to group 1 as shown in Table 9. 
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co = 
1 
0 
= group 1 
= group 2 
Table 9: Object clustering generating cluster (C0) 
Ci = (3,3,3,3) group 1 
C2 = (2,2,2,2) group 2 
4. Determine a new centroid. It uses equation 2 below to calculate the new centroid position: 
M"vn 
(new) 
^yn - dE_ = f^yn + 2 (xn- M-yn) 
djiyn 
(2) 
£ is a learning rate that takes a small positive number (e.g., 0.05) or gradually decreases in the 
learning process 
jXyn = 4, S = 0.05. Since there are no objects in group 2, the centroid at group 2 will remain 
(new) 
unchanged at (2, 2, 2, 2). The new centroid JHvn (new center position) for group 1 will 
be as follows; 
(new) jLlynV ' = 3 + 0.05 ((5-3)+ (3-3)+ (2-3)+ (1-3)) 
r l yn^ 6 ^ = 3 + °-05 (_1 ) = 2-95 
45 
After recalculating the centroid, group 1 has the new centroid 2.95. Group 2 centroid remains 
unchanged as no objects are assigned to it. Our new matrix for first iteration is shown in Figure 
20. 
k 
5 
3 
2 
1 
^ 
6 
6 
3 
1 
Ci 
2.95 
2.95 
2.95 
2.95 
Ca 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Figure 20: Matrix records for iterationl 
The next object (R2) will now be allocated to a cluster. The object-centroid distance is now 
calculated as shown in No. 2. 
Dl (Mj, CI) = V {(6-2.95)2 + (6-2.95)2 + (3-2.95)2 + (1-2.95)2 } = V22.41 = 4.73 
Dj (Mj,C2) = V {(6-2)2 + (6-2)2 + (3-2)2 + (1-2)2 } = «^34= 5.83 
Di represents distance at iteration 1. 
Dl = [4.73 5.83] 
Based on the minimum distance, Con2 is assigned to group 1. 
c l = 
1 
_0 
= group 1 
= group 2 
Table 10: Object clustering generating cluster (Ci) 
The two records Coni and Con2 are now assigned to group 1. New centroid for group 1 is 
recomputed, group 2 centroid will still remain the same since no object is assigned to it. The 
re-computation of cluster centroid continues until each group remains unchanged. 
• To separate intrusive objects from normal instances; 
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Find the largest cluster, i.e., the one with the most number of instances, and 
label it normal. Assume its centroid is jua 
• Sort the remaining clusters in ascending order of the distance from each cluster centroid 
to ju0. Within a cluster, sort the data instances in the same way (i.e., ascending order of 
distance from each data instance to ju0). 
• Select all clusters that have a distance (to ju0) greater than t)D, and label them as 
intrusive where D is the largest distance from the centroid of the largest cluster to the 
farthest instance in y and rj is the portion of the instances farthest away from the largest 
cluster. 
• Label all the other instances as attacks. 
Assume group i is the largest cluster with a centroid (i0 of 3. D is 3.23 and rj = 0.17 then yD = 
0.55. So it means that any cluster that the distance from centroid u0 of group 1 is greater than 
0.55 will be labeled as intrusive cluster. 
To measure the performance (accuracy) of the proposed clustering-based intrusion detection 
approach, they ask a wireless network expert to assign normal or intrusive label to each cluster. 
The expert was given the average statistics of each feature for a cluster, but not the distance 
relationship between clusters. The expert categorized each cluster solely based on his 
understanding of the relationship between metrics and attacks. The set of expert-assigned 
labels are then used as the "ground truth" for the evaluation of their clustering based methods. 
They have done experiments on their system with three weeks datasets and claimed that the 
effectiveness of the clustering-based wireless intrusion detection method was validated. 
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2.3. Classification Rule Concept: 
Intrusion detection can be thought of as a classification problem: we wish to classify each audit 
record into one of a discrete set of possible categories, normal or a particular kind of intrusion. 
Given a set of records, where one of the features is the class label (i.e., the concept), 
classification algorithms can compute a model that uses the most discriminating feature values 
to describe each concept. 
2.3.1. Neural Networks: 
Neural Networks are analytic techniques modeled after the processes of learning in the 
cognitive system which is capable of predicting new observations on specific variables from 
other observations on the same or other variables after executing a process of so-called 
learning from existing data (Han and Kamber 2005). Pattern recognition is one of the most 
common uses for neural networks. Pattern recognition is a form of classification. A neural 
network trained for classification is designed to take input samples and classify them into 
groups. Therefore we can classify the Neural Network into Classification Techniques in data 
mining (Han and Kamber 2005). We have used the Neural Network techniques in our proposed 
system. 
We are going to describe briefly the Neural Network basics in the rest of this section and also 
the training algorithm called Back-Propagation in the following section. After a briefing of 
Neural Network basics, we will go through our proposed system in section 3. 
Neural Network (NN) is an interconnected group of artificial neurons that uses a mathematical 
or computational model for information processing based on a connectionistic approach to 
computation (Dunham 2003). In most cases a Neural Network is an adaptive system that 
changes its structure based on external or internal information that flows through the network. 
In more practical terms neural networks are non-linear statistical data modeling or decision 
making tools. They can be used to model complex relationships between inputs and outputs or 
to find patterns in data. 
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Neural Networks are very sophisticated modeling techniques capable of modeling extremely 
complex functions (Ramadas et al. 2003). The neural network user gathers representative data, 
and then invokes training algorithms to automatically learn the structure of the data. Although 
the user does need to have some heuristic knowledge of how to select and prepare data, how to 
select an appropriate neural network, and how to interpret the results, the level of user 
knowledge needed to successfully apply neural networks is much lower than would be the case 
using some more traditional nonlinear statistical methods. 
The most common neural network model is the Multilayer Perceptron (MLP). This type of 
neural network is known as a supervised network because it requires a desired output in order 
to learn. The goal of this type of network is to create a model that correctly maps the input to 
the output using historical data so that the model can then be used to produce the output when 
the desired output is unknown. A graphical representation of an MLP is shown below. 
Input First Second Output 
Lajer Hidden Hidden Lajpr 
La^er La^er 
Figure 21: Multilayer Perceptron [MLP] Model 
The above figure 21 is of a two hidden layer multiplayer perceptron (MLP). The inputs are fed 
into the input layer and get multiplied by interconnection weights as they are passed from the 
input layer to the first hidden layer. Within the first hidden layer, they get summed then 
processed by a nonlinear function. As the processed data leave the first hidden layer, again they 
get multiplied by interconnection weights, then summed and processed by the second hidden 
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layer. Finally, the data are multiplied by interconnection weights then processed one last time 
within the output layer to produce the neural network output. 
The MLP and many other neural networks learn using an algorithm called back-propagation. 
With back-propagation, the input data are repeatedly presented to the neural network. With 
each presentation the output of the neural network is compared to the desired output and an 
error is computed. This error is then fed back (back-propagated) to the neural network and used 
to adjust the weights such that the error decreases with each iteration and the neural model gets 
closer and closer to producing the desired output. This process is known as "training". 
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Figure 22: Neural Network Learning for XOR Data 
The above diagram Demonstrates a neural network learning to model the exclusive-or (XOR) 
data. The XOR data is repeatedly presented to the neural network. With each presentation, the 
error between the network output and the desired output is computed and fed back to the neural 
network. The neural network uses this error to adjust its weights such that the error will be 
decreased. This sequence of events is usually repeated until an acceptable error has been 
reached or until the network no longer appears to be learning. 
2.3.1.1. Applications for Neural Networks: 
Neural networks are applicable in virtually every situation in which a relationship between the 
predictor variables (independents, inputs) and predicted variables (dependents, outputs) exists, 
even when that relationship is very complex and not easy to articulate in the usual terms of 
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"correlations" or "differences between groups." A few representative examples of problems to 
which neural network analysis has been applied successfully are: 
• Detection of medical phenomena. A variety of health-related indices (e.g., a 
combination of heart rate, levels of various substances in the blood, respiration rate) can be 
monitored. The onset of a particular medical condition could be associated with a very 
complex (e.g., nonlinear and interactive) combination of changes on a subset of the variables 
being monitored. Neural networks have been used to recognize this predictive pattern so that 
the appropriate treatment can be prescribed. 
• Stock market prediction. Fluctuations of stock prices and stock indices are another 
example of a complex, multidimensional, but in some circumstances at least partially-
deterministic phenomenon. Neural networks are being used by many technical analysts to 
make predictions about stock prices based upon a large number of factors such as past 
performance of other stocks and various economic indicators. 
• Credit assignment. A variety of pieces of information are usually known about an 
applicant for a loan. For instance, the applicant's age, education, occupation, and many other 
facts may be available. After training a neural network on historical data, neural network 
analysis can identify the most relevant characteristics and use those to classify applicants as 
good or bad credit risks. 
• Monitoring the condition of machinery. Neural networks can be instrumental in 
cutting costs by bringing additional expertise to scheduling the preventive maintenance of 
machines. A neural network can be trained to distinguish between the sounds a machine makes 
when it is running normally ("false alarms") versus when it is on the verge of a problem. After 
this training period, the expertise of the network can be used to warn a technician of an 
upcoming breakdown, before it occurs and causes costly unforeseen "downtime." 
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« Engine management. Neural networks have been used to analyze the input of sensors 
from an engine. The neural network controls the various parameters within which the engine 
functions, in order to achieve a particular goal, such as minimizing fuel consumption. 
2.3.1.2. Back-Propagation Algorithm 
Back-Propagation learns by iteratively processing a set of training samples, comparing the 
network's prediction for each sample with the actual known class level. For each training 
sample, the weights are modified so as to minimize the mean squared error between the 
network's prediction and the actual class (Han and Kamber 2005). These modifications are made 
in the backwards direction, from the output layer, through each hidden layer down to the first 
hidden layer. 
We have implemented the back propagation algorithm in our proposed system for training 
purpose is summarized in the following figure 23: 
Algorithm: Backpropagation. Neural Learning for classification, using the backpropagation 
algorithm. 
Input: The training 
network. 
samples, samples; learning rate, /; a multilayer feed-forward network, 
Output: A neural network trained to classify the samples. 
Method: 
(1) Initialize all weights and biases in network; 
(2) while terminating condition in not satisfied { 
(3) for each training sample X in samples { 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
the previous layer, i 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
// Propagate the inputs forward: 
for each hidden or output layer unit j { 
Ij = YJ wy Oi + Of //compute the net input of unit j with respect to 
Oi = 1 / 1 + e~'J ; } // compute the output of each unit j 
// Backpropagate the errors: 
for each unit j in the output layer 
Errj = Oj (1 - Oj)(Tj - Oj); II compute the error 
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(11) 
(12) 
the next higher 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) }} 
layer, 
for each unit j in the hidden layers, from the last to the first hidden layer 
Errj = Oj (1 - Oj) YJ< Errk wjk', II compute the error with respect to 
k 
for each weight w,y in network { 
Aw,y = (1) Errj 0,; // weight increment 
w,y = w,y + Aw,y-; } // weight update 
for each bias Oj in network { 
AOj = (1) Errj; // bias increment 
Oj = Oj + AOj; } // bias update 
Figure 23: Back-propagation Algorithm. 
Each step of the Back-propagation algorithm (Han and Kamber 2005) is briefly described below: 
Initialize the weights: 
The weights in the network are initialized to small random numbers ranging from - 1.0 to 1.0. 
Each unit has a bias associated with it. The biases are similarly initialized to small random 
numbers. 
Each training sample, X, is processed by the following steps. 
Propagate the inputs forward: 
In this step, the net input and output of each unit in the hidden and output layers are computed. 
First, the training sample is fed to the input layer of the network. Note that for unity in the 
input layer, its output is equal to its input, that is Oj = Ij for input unity. The net input to each 
unit in the hidden layer and output layers is computed as a linear combination of its inputs. A 
hidden layer or output layer unit is shown in figure 29. The inputs to the unit are the outputs of 
the units connected to it in the previous layer. To compute the net input to the unit, each input 
connected to the unit is multiplied by its corresponding weight, and this is summed. Given a 
unity in a hidden or output layer, the net input, Ij, to unity is: 
Ij = liWjOi + 0J 
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where wy is the weight of the connection from unit I in the previous layer to unit j ; Ot is the 
output of unit i from the previous layer; and #, is the bias of the unit. The bias acts as a 
threshold in that it serves to vary the activity of the unit. 
XQ 
Xi 
Weights 
w0i 
Wjj 
w, nj 
Inputs (outputs 
from previous 
layer) 
dm WVP 
Bias 
e, 
Weighted 
Sum 
I 
/ 
Activation 
Function 
Outrnit 
Figure 24: Neural Network Structure 
In above figure 24, a hidden or output layer unity: The inputs to unity are outputs from the 
previous layer. These are multiplied by their corresponding weights in order to form a 
weighted sum, which is added to the bias associated with unity. A nonlinear activation function 
is applied to the net input. 
Each unit in the hidden and output layers takes its net input and then applies an activation 
function to it. The function symbolizes the activation of the neuron represented by the unit. The 
following sigmoid function (Han and Kamber 2005) is used. Given the net input Ij to unity, then 
Oj, the output of the unity, is composed as 
Oi = l/l + e'1J 
This sigmoid function is non-linear and differentiable, allowing the back-propagation 
algorithm to model classification problems that are linearly inseparable. 
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Back Propagate the Error: 
The error is propagated backwards by updating the weights and biases to reflact the error of the 
network's prediction. For a unity in the output layer, the error Err/ is computed by the 
following: 
Errj=Oj(l-Oj)(Tj-Oj) 
Where Oj is the actual output of unity, and 7} is the true output, based on the known class label 
of the given training sample. 
To compute the error of a hidden layer unit j , the weighted sum of the errors of the units 
connected to unit j in the next layer are considered. The error of a hidden layer unit j is as 
follows: 
Errj = Oj (1 - Oj) X* Errk wjk 
where w,* is the weight of the connection from unity to a unit k in the next higher layer, and 
Errk is the error of unit k. 
The weights and biases are updated to reflect the propagated errors. Weights are updated by the 
following equations, where Aw,y is the change in w,y: 
Av/y = 0)ErrJOl 
Wy = W,y + AWy 
The variable / is the learning rate, a constant typically having a value between 0.0 and 1.0. 
Backpropagation learns using a method of gradient decent to search for a set of weights that 
can model the given classification problem so as to minimize the mean squared distance 
between the network's class prediction and the actual class label of the samples. The learning 
rate helps to avoid getting stuck at a local minimum in decision space and encourages finding 
the global minimum. If the learning rate is too small, then learning will occur at a very slow 
pace. If the learning rate is too large, then oscillation between inadequate solutions may occur. 
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A rule of thumb is to set learning rate to 1/t, where t is the number of iterations through the 
training set so far. 
Biases are updated by the following equation, where AQj is the change in bias 6f. 
A6j=(\)Errj 
0J=9J+A8J 
Note that here we are updating the weights and biases after presentation of each sample. This is 
referred to as case updating. Alternatively, the weight and bias increments could be 
accumulated in variables, so that the weights and biases are updated after all of the samples in 
the training set have been presented. This later strategy is called epoch updating, where one 
iteration through the training set is an epoch. In theory, the mathematical derivation of back-
propagation employs epoch updating, but case updating is more common since it tends to yield 
more accurate results. 
Terminating Condition: 
Training stops when 
• All Aw,y in the previous epoch were so small as to be below some specified 
threshold, or 
• The percentage of samples misclassified in the previous epoch is below some 
threshold, or 
• A pre-specified number of epochs has expired. 
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2.3.1.3. Example for Learning by Back-propagation Algorithm: 
Figure 25 shows a multilayer feed-forward neural network. Let the learning rate be 0.9. The 
initial weights and bias values of the network are given in table 11, table 12 and table 13, along 
with first training sample, X = (1, 0, 1), whose class label is 1. 
Xi 
x2 
X3 
Figure 25: An example of a multilayer Neural Network 
Xi 
1 
X2 
0 
X3 
1 
Table 11: Initial Input 
W14 
0.2 
H>I5 
-0.3 
*>24 
0.4 
W25 
0.1 
W34 
-0.5 
W35 
0.2 
W46 
-0.3 
WS6 
-0.2 
Table 12: Initial weights 
04 
-0.4 
0s 
0.2 
06 
0.1 
Table 13: Initial bias values 
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The net input and output calculations using following two equations are showed in table 14: 
Oi = l/l +e'lJ 
Unit/ 
4 
5 
6 
Net input, lt 
0.2 + 0 - 0.5 - 0.4 = -0.7 
-0.3 + 0 + 0.2 + 0.2 = 0.1 
(-0.3) (0.332) - (0.2)(0.525) + 0.1 = -0.105 
Output, Oj 
1/(1+eu/) = 0.332 
1/(1 + e~ul) = 0.525 
1/(1 + e0105) = 0.474 
Table 14: The net input and output calculations 
Calculation for the error at each node using following two equations are showed in table 15: 
Errj=Oj(l-Oj)(Tj-Oj) 
Errj = Oj (1 - Oj) X* Errk wjk 
Unity 
6 
5 
4 
Err, 
(0.474) (1 -0.474) (1 -0.474) = 0.1311 
(0.525) (1 - 0.525) (0.1311) (-0.2) = - 0.0065 
(0.332) (1 - 0.332) (0.1311) (-0.3) = - 0.0087 
Table 15: Error calculation for each node 
Calculation for Weight updating by using following two equations are showed in table 16: 
Awy = (1) Errj 0{ 
W y = W y + AWy 
Weights 
w46 
W56 
W14 
WIS 
W24 
W25 
W34 
W35 
New Value 
-0.3 + (0.9)(0.1311)(0.332) = -0.261 
-0.2 + (0.9)(0.1311)(0.525) = -0.138 
0.2 + (0.9)(-0.0087)(l) = 0.192 
-0.3 + (0.9)(-0.0065)(1) = -0.306 
0.4 + (0.9)(-0.0087)(0) = 0.4 
0.1+(0.9)(-0.0065)(0) = 0.1 
-0.5 + (0.9)(-0.0087)(l) = -0.508 
0.2+ (0.9)(-0.0065)(l) = 0.194 
Table 16: Calculation for Weight updating 
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Calculation for Bias updating by using following two equations are showed in table 17: 
Bias 
06 
05 
04 
New Values 
0.1 + (0.9)(0.1311) = 0.218 
0.2 + (0.9)(-0.0065) = 0.194 
-0.4 + (0.9X-0.0087) = -0.408 
Table 17: Calculation for Bias updating 
2.3.2. N9DS Using Neural Network: 
A Wireless Intrusion Detection Method Based on Dynamic Growing 
Neural Network 
In this research paper (Liu et al. 2006), the authors presented an intrusion detection method 
based on Dynamic Growing Neural Network (DGNN) for wireless networking. The main 
character of the method is that it is an anomaly detection method and can learn the normal 
behavior. DGNN is based on the Hebbian learning rule and adds new neurons under certain 
conditions. When DGNN performs supervised learning, resonance will happen if the winner 
can't match the training example; this rule combines the Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) 
(Grossberg 1996) neural network and Winner-Tale-All (WTA) learning algorithm. When 
DGNN performs unsupervised learning, post-prune is carried out to prevent overfitting the 
training data just like decision tree learning. To improve wireless intrusion detection accuracy, 
we use an artificial neural network to perform anomaly detection. The following features are 
introduced in their proposed system: 
Feature Selection: 
The basic premise for anomaly detection is that there is intrinsic and observable characteristic 
of normal behaviour that is distinct from that of abnormal behaviour. Three main parts in 
anomaly detection system are: feature selection, model of normal behaviour, and comparison. 
Feature selection is a critical part in building normal behaviour model and performing 
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comparison. In their proposed method, they selected and constructed features from MAC layer. 
All 802.11 frames are composed by Preamble, PLCP Header, MAC Data, and CRC. Each 
MAC Data frame consists of the following basic components: A MAC header, which 
comprises frame control, duration, address, and sequence control information; A variable 
length frame body, which contains information specific to the frame type; A frame check 
sequence (FCS), which contains an IEEE 32-bit cyclic redundancy code (CRC). The frame 
control field consists of control information, those four address fields indicate the BSSID, 
source address, destination address, transmitting station address, and receiving station address. 
All these information can be used to construct features. 
Intrusion Detection Process 
The behaviour of the network can be described as follows. At first, a training vector x is 
presented to the network and each neuron receives this sample. Then the dissimilarity measure 
between x and each synaptic weight will be computed. After that, the competitive function will 
choose the winner neuron and compute the penalizing rate of other neurons. Last, the learning 
rule part gets the result of competitive and updates the synaptic weights. The output is the 
winner neuron, which represents a cluster. The summary of the operation is as follows: 
StepO: Initialize learning rate parameter fi, penalizing rate parameter fi, the threshold of 
dissimilarity v; 
Stepl: Get the first input x and set wo = x as the initial weight; 
Step2: If training is over go to step 6, else randomly takes a feature vector x from the feature 
sample set X and computes the dissimilarity measure between x and each synaptic weight dt; 
Step3: Decide the winner neuron j and tests tolerance: If (dj >= v) add a new neuron and sets 
synaptic weight w = x , goto Step2; 
Step4: Compute the penalizing rate y,; 
Step5: Update the synaptic weight Wj, goto Setp2. 
Step6: Use prune algorithm to prune the similar weights. 
In supervised learning training vector x and neuron vector w includes the class identifier. If 
their identifier is the same the learning will carry out. DGNN first studies the normal behaviour 
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of WLAN to construct the normal feature set. When the neural network is stable, we can use it 
to monitors the WLAN, If an intruder is trying to intrude the network, the intrusion detection 
system can find it in real time and alarm immediately. 
IWTA algorithm 
The learning algorithm of DGNN is Improved Winner-Take-All (IWTA), which extends the 
basic competitive learning algorithm - Winner-Tale-All (WTA). The basic idea of IWTA is not 
only the winner is rewarded as in WTA but also all the losers are penalized in different rate. 
There are some similarities between IWTA and RPCL (Nair et al. 2003). The principle 
underlying RPCL is that in each iteration, the cluster center for the winner's neuron is 
accentuated (rewarded) where at the weight for the second winner, or the rival, is attenuated 
(penalized), and the remaining neurons are unaffected. IWTA is similar to LTCL (Nair et al. 
2003) too, but in IWTA the penalized rate is based on the dissimilarity level. 
The IWTA is summarized as follows: 
i. Use the following equation to measure to measure the dissimilarity between input 
vector X and weight vector w-,, / = 1,...., n , n is the number of neurons; 
f i 
d, =«/{x,w.) = 
ii. Arrange the neurons according to dt from small to big and the smallest is the winner. 
Determine the rewarding neuron and penalizing rate of other neurons as 
1, tfaewitMiier 
• /#—, others 
where fi is the penalizing rate parameter, v is the threshold of dissimilarity. 
iii. If the winner's dissimilarity measure d < v, then update the synaptic weight by learning 
rule as 
W , ( H l )= W,(f)H (i\yit-\ i M n l ) - flW^l 
where ji > 0 is the learning rate parameter, i indicates / th neuron. When the neuron is active 
y = 1, // = // *V[ we get 
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Else add a new neuron and set the synaptic weight w = x. 
Post-prune algorithm 
Neural network may also bring the overfitting problem. In decision tree learning, it uses post-
prune method to prevent overfitting. DGNN also performs the post-prune to overcome this 
problem. The prune strategy based on the distance threshold and if two weights are too similar 
they will be substituted by a new weight. The new weight is calculated as 
Wnew = (W0id, X U - W0ld2 X t2) / (ti - t2) 
where tj is the training times of W0m, t2 is the training times of W0td2 
The prune algorithm is shown below: 
StepO: If old weights meet (oldW) is null then algorithm is over 
else go on; 
Stepl: calculate the distance between the first weight (fw) and the other weights; 
Step2: find the weight (sw) who is the most similar to fw; 
Step3: if the distance between sw and fw is bigger than prune threshold then delete fw from 
old Wand add fw into new weights meet (newW) go to step 0; 
else go on; 
Step4: get/vv's training times value (ft) and sw's training times value (st); 
Step5: calculate the new weight (raw) and raw's training times value (nt), 
nw=(fw *ft + sw* st)l(ft+st), 
nt=ft + st, 
Step6: delete fw and sw from oldW, and add nw into newW, go to step 0. 
In the simulation the authors first trained DGNN using the benchmark which contains 600 
examples of control charts synthetically generated by the process in Alcock and Manolopoulos 
(1999). There are six different classes of control charts: Normal, Cyclic, Increasing trend, 
Decreasing trend, Upward shift, and Downward shift. The training result is show in Table 18. 
In the dataset the classes are organized as follows: 1-100 are Normal, 101-200 are Cyclic, 201-
300 are Increasing trend, 301-400 are Decreasing trend, 401-500 Upward shift, and 501-600 
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are Downward shift. After training they have used each class data to test which weight more 
similar it. It is found that DGNN can perfectly predicate Normal/Cyclic classes. But it is often 
confused by Decreasing trend/Downward shift and Increasing trend/ Upward shift classes. 
To solve this problem they used the post-prune algorithm to cluster the similar weights which 
have been gotten when distance threshold is 35. When the prune threshold is 40, the prune 
result is shown in Table 19 After 7 epochs prune, all the 275 weights have been clustered to 33 
weights. 
Blsiartee IfarshoM T,^ ^g $Q ^J 4% 
Mamter of weights 275 155 S? 4S 34 
Table 18: DGNN Training Result 
Pt EM? epodh j 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Num&er of weights
 l f i 9 1 0 9 ? 6 5 6 42 3 6 33 
Table 19: Prune Result 
The Normal class has been clustered to No.l weight and it can perfectly predicate Normal data. 
The results show that Decreasing trend and Increasing trend all clustered to two weights, other 
weights have cluster to Downward shift and Upward shift. Through analyze and test the 
weights it can be found that the reason to confuse Decreasing trend/Downward shift and 
Increasing trend/ Upward shift is two weights which have been shown with dotted lines in the 
figures. So if we delete those two weights the neural network can perfectly predict synthetic 
control chart time series. 
In this experiment, the authors have evaluated their proposed method. They first train the 
neural network with different normal features, then use the stable neural network to monitor 
the system where some abnormal behaviours are happening under the same environment. They 
have tested the false alarm rate under different learning and detection conditions. MAC 
address, IP address, and some control information were taken out from packet to construct 
features of WLAN. In detection process, one PC of room A carried out ping death attack to the 
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WLAN and a desktop PC with TL-WN650G/PCI sniffs the WLAN. In their experiment they 
found that DGNN can detect those attacks. After 1.5xl04 times training, the neural network 
could learn the normal behaviour of this WLAN and the error rate was about 15%. 
The main problem of the method is that it usually falsely alarm new normal adding mobile 
client as intruder, and some abnormal behavior of added station cannot be found. Some famous 
attacks such as RTS/CTS based DoS cannot be prevented by this method. So their plan was to 
extend their work by adding some rule-based expert system and response methods to improve 
detection accuracy. 
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3. Proposed System for Wireless Intrusion Detection: 
The timely and accurate detection of computer and network system intrusions has always been 
an elusive goal for system administrators and information security researchers. The individual 
creativity of attackers, the wide range of computer hardware and operating systems, and the 
ever changing nature of the overall threat to target systems have contributed to the difficulty in 
effectively identifying intrusions. A single intrusion of a computer network can result in the 
loss or unauthorized utilization or modification of large amounts of data and cause users to 
question the reliability of all of the information on the network. 
The constantly changing nature of network attacks requires a flexible defensive system that is 
capable of analyzing the enormous amount of network traffic in a manner which is less 
structured than rule-based systems. A neural network-based misuse detection system could 
potentially address many of the intrusions that are found in rule-based systems. Rule-based 
systems suffer from an inability to detect attacks scenarios that may occur over an extended 
period of time and also lack flexibility in the rule-to-audit record representation (Cannady 
2000). Slight variations in an attack sequence can affect the activity-rule comparison to a 
degree that the intrusion is not detected by the intrusion detection mechanism. A neural 
network conducts an analysis of the data and provides a probability estimate that the data 
matches the characteristics which it has been trained to recognize. Therefore, we have used 
Neural Network technique in our proposed wireless network intrusion detection system. 
The main advantages of the artificial neural networks include the ability of faster information 
processing, the ability of classification, the ability of learning and self-organization. By virtue 
of these abilities of the artificial neural networks, the network intrusion detection system can 
analyze the network stream real time and detect whether there exist intrusions or not (Jing et al. 
2004). 
A neural network conducts an analysis of the information and provides a probability estimate 
that the data matches the characteristics which it has been trained to recognize. While the 
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probability of a match determined by a neural network can be almost 100%, though the 
accuracy of its decisions relies totally on the experience the system gains from training period. 
3.1. Overview of the Proposed System - NeuDetect: 
To be effective Intrusion Detection System for wireless sensor network, it should always 
monitor the airwaves to recognize and prevent attacks before the attacker authenticates to 
Access Point (AP). Our wireless LAN will make use of stream of sensor data from a remote 
sensor IDS that continuously monitors the wireless packets and extracts information like 
source and destination MAC address, the sequence number and AP the wireless station is 
trying to connect to, by reading 802.11b frames. Then the extracted data will be analyzed and 
pre-processed to serve as input to our Neural Network based anomaly detection module, where 
we have used the Back-Propagation algorithm for finding anomalies. From the figure 26 below 
we can see that our proposed wireless intrusion detection system based on the artificial neural 
networks includes several modules, now we will introduce briefly each module separately. 
Data Collection 
Module 
Sensor 
Sensor 
> 
Data Processor 
Module 
Extracts selected 
attribute values 
from wireless 
sensor log by 
Commview for 
WiFi and outputs 
csv file 
i> 
1 V > 
Detection 
Module 
Detects 
anomalous data 
packets by 
using Back-
Propagation 
Algorithm 
f 
1 
I > 
Decision 
Module 
Triggers Alert 
Figure 26: Prototype Structure of the Proposed System 
The NeuDetect algorithm is presented as Algorithm 1 in figure 27. The proposed model finds 
the anomalous patterns after having training data by using Back-Propagation Neural Network 
techniques. 
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\Algorithm 1: (NeuDetect: Wireless IDS) 
Algorithm NeuDetectO 
Input: Wireless Data Packets (P), Sensors (S), Access Points (AP) 
Output: Anomalous Packets (A), Alert 
Begin 
While (true) 
(1) Capture wireless packets from AP using sensors (S) 
(2) Extract connection packets (P)from sensors S with 
Commview for WiFi software and save as .csvfile 
(3) Call Back-Propagation Algorithm insert 
.csvfile records as input and output anomalous 
records (A) 
(4) Triggers alerts. 
End 
Figure 27: Algorithm 1 - NeuDetect Model 
3.2.1. Data Collection Module: 
This module monitors network stream real time and capture wireless data packets to serve as 
the data source of the NIDS. Our Packet Capture module contains the proprietary Network 
Chemistry wireless hardware sensors (Network Chemistry 2006). The goal of this module is to 
capture wireless network packets successfully from a selected Access Point (AP) and log them 
into the database. Then the Feature Extractor module converts the raw data to readable format 
with help of CommView (CommView for WiFi 2007) for WiFi software and outputs a csv file 
(csv stands for Comma Seperated Values where attributes values are simple text separated by 
commas). 
So, for the Data Collection and Data Processor module we have to perfectly install and 
configure 1) Wireless Access Point (AP), 2) RF Sensors including both a sensor server and a 
sensor client software, 3) CommView for WiFi software, 4) MS SQL Server database as 
shown in figure 28. 
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Figure 28: Data Collection and Data Processor Module 
Clients connect to the wireless network through Access Point (AP) and our sensors are 
configured and associated with the AP, so that, the sensor can capture all the packets sent by 
the client to the AP. In this way, we ensure that all packets from clients that pass through our 
network are captured by the sensor. Sensors receive and analyze all 802.11 packets, analyze the 
data, and send processed data to the Server, where the information is stored. For the Sensors to 
perform their function, we installed and configured RFprotect Server and Client software of 
Network Chemistry Sensors. 
The RFprotect Server analyzes, stores, and integrates data from Sensors. The Server comprises 
the RFprotect Engine, a database of known stations, experts, location analysis, alerts, and 
reported events. The Server consolidates and analyzes wireless traffic, generates alerts and 
maintains a database for the RFprotect console users. 
The Console (client) provides the information presentation and operator controls for RFprotect. 
The Console is the main suite of tools for viewing and managing the information provided by 
the RFprotect Server and Sensors, and provides views of wireless activity, security alerts, and 
RF environmental analysis. 
The minimum requirements for installing the Sensor software are as follows: 
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• Windows XP, 2000, 2003 or Linux operating system 
• 2.4GHz or greater CPU 
• 1GByte memory 
Hardware configuration of our system for Sensor Server and Client Installation: 
• Windows XP Professional Operating System Service pack 2 
• Pentium 4 CPU 3.06 GHZ 
• 1 GB RAM 
• 150 GB of Hard disk 
Sensor Software installation steps: 
The software installation is easy. We first installed the server software before the client. With 
the software CD inside the CDROM drive, we started the RFprotectServer and the installer 
displays a Welcome screen dialog box. Select all the default and continue clicking "Next" until 
completing the RFprotectServer setup wizard then click Finish and then proceed to creating the 
database wizard. We also choose the default for the database creation which uses firebird. The 
RFprotectClient installation is also easy. We selected all the default for this installation. 
Configuring Sensors: 
After installation we launch the RFprotectClient, as shown in figure 29, and then we enter the 
password. 
Network Chi'imslry PFprott'tl I'.un 
RFprotect Console Login 
Client/Server Edition 
Version: 5.0.6 
Connect f Advanced! 
Cho«s« Ihe sawei to connect to from the Aop dawn Ifet 
connection setfirtg? for e new; server. 
Server 
Usemartie 
Password 
jlocalhost 
JSYSDBA 
p-i 
or enter the 
"3 
Conneet 
Figure 29: RFProtect Login Window 
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The screen in figure 30 will appear showing that no sensor has been added. To add a sensor, 
we click on the Add sensor button, then the discover sensor window as shown in figure 31 is 
open. 
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Figure 30: Sensor Configuration Window 
Figure 31: Discover Sensor Window 
We double-click our Sensor that we want to configure. The dialog in figure 32 appears. 
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Figure 32: Sensor IP address Configuration 
1. Click the Address tab. 
2. Click Obtain an IP address automatically using DHCP to cause Sensors to use DHCP to get 
their IP address, gateway, and domain. 
3. Click Apply. 
4. Configure the Server address for the Sensor by clicking the Server tab 
Once a Sensor is added the Configuration window first appears with the unrecognized Sensor 
displayed, shown in figure 33. The lock icon indicates that the sensor is not yet communicating 
with the server. Clicking the check box will make the sensor to communicate with the server. 
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Figure 33: Console window with unknown sensor 
Once the sensor is configured to send data to the server, the sensor is displayed in the Console. 
Figure 34 shows our sensor in a communication state. 
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Figure 34: Console window with sensor 
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Monitoring and capturing packets 
Once the sensor is configured, it is able to detect all wireless networks around it as can be seen 
in figure 35 below. Then we select the AP from which we want to capture the packets, we right 
click on it and select external capture as shown in figure 36. 
It is worth noting here that the Network chemistry RFprotect sensor is a capture device for 
Packetyzer. Packetyzer is a packet capture program that is installed with the Network 
Chemistry RFprotect software. Figure 36 shows Packetyzer has been used to capture packets in 
WiFiMiner. The RFprotect is a signature-based Intrusion protection system for 802.1 la/b/g 
wireless connections that is used to detect rogue devices, intrusion and DOS attacks. It is not 
capable of detecting new or unknown attacks unless the signature of that attack is updated in 
the RFprotect server. 
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Figure 36: Captured packets using Packetyzer 
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3.2.2. Data Processor Module: 
This module extracts feature vector from the network stream and submits the feature vector to 
the Back-Propagation (BP) model. Here the feature vector should serve for the description of 
the network stream. Wireless Network stream itself is not suitable directly as the input of the 
BP Classifier, so it is necessary to extract some features from the network stream. Feature 
selection and extraction is one of the pivotal problems in implementing the intrusion detection 
system. The core of anomaly detection in wireless network lies in selecting features that have 
enough weight to detect intrusions. For example, attackers look for open ports as a passage 
through which to enter the network and launch their attacks. It means that features like Ports 
(source and destination), MAC address (source and destination), Total number of packets and 
the size of the packet sent in a certain time interval, will play a vital role in detecting the 
attacks. The features extracted from the wireless network stream forms a feature vector which 
serves for the description of the packet. After a detailed study of network attacks we have 
selected the following feature/ attributes to form the feature vector that we hope will be able to 
detect wireless attacks. 
Feature/ Attribute 
ESSID 
SrcMAC 
destMAC 
SrcIP 
destIP 
Packet Size 
Time 
srcPort 
destPort 
. Channel 
Definition 
The Access Point (AP) Name 
Source MAC Address 
Destination MAC Address 
The source IP address 
The destination IP address 
The number of bytes 
Time stamp 
Source Port no 
Destination Port no 
Channel Number 
Table 20: Wireless Packet Measurement Attributes 
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We have used a very powerful tool, Commview for WiFi, in our data processor module to 
analyze and extract the features for 802.11 a/b/g/n captured wireless packets. With Commview 
for WiFi, we can easily select which features/ attributes are to be exported into the csv file. A 
sample of csv file is shown in following figure 37. 
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Figure 37: Sample preprocessed csv file output by Commview for WiFi 
We have used an ETL tool called MS SQL Server Information Services (SSIS) to load from 
.cvs file into MS SQL Server database. 
3.2.3. Detection Module: 
The function of this module is to analyze the network stream and to draw a conclusion whether 
normal or anomalous. To analyze the network stream we have used Back-Propagation (BP) 
technique, the most widely used neural network technique, which has made a good figure in 
the field of Pattern Recognition. In fact, the problem to be solved by the intrusion detection 
system is to differentiate "Bad Packets" from "Good Packets" in the network stream. In this 
sense, "Intrusion Detection" can be understood as "Pattern Recognition" to some extent (Jing et 
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al. 2004). From this point of view, we select Back-Propagation model in the design of the 
NIDS prototype based on the artificial neural networks. There are several conditions which 
should be considered in the design of the detection module by using Back-Propagation 
technique: 
• The number of hidden layers: It is rare to have more than two hidden layers in the neural 
network structure. For general applications one hidden layer is enough. That's why in the 3-
layer Neural Network, we have set one hidden layer in-between input and output layer. 
• The dimension of the input layer and the output layer. Generally speaking, the dimension of 
the input layer is the number of the features selected, and the dimension of the output layer is 
the number of outputs that can be classified by the Detection Module. We have selected 10 
attributes from the feature vector as input layer and 1 attribute as output layer. 
• The dimension of the hidden layer. In contrast with the input layer and the output layer, the 
dimension of the hidden layer is difficult to determine. There is no deterministic theory that 
can be applied on this problem. The book (Masters 2006) presented a formula which we have 
used to determine the dimension of the hidden layer. The formula is as follows: 
Hidden Layer = Vmn = VlxlO = VlO = 3.16 
Where, m = dimension of output layer and n = dimension of input layer. 
Therefore, we have taken 3 attributes in the hidden layer for our BP Neural Network. 
• The activation function. In general, the function 
/f*;=l/(l+exp(-x)) 
can be used in the Detection Module. 
• Initialization of the weight and the threshold. The weight of different neural units and the 
threshold will be set to a small random number from -1 to 1. By doing so, the convergence of 
the BP network can be ensured. 
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After taking these conditions into account carefully, we have designed a prototype Neural 
Network for our proposed system as follows in figure 38. We have drawn the following figure 
with 6 inputs to avoid a clumsy figure and also to do step by step demonstration of manual 
calculation for the training algorithm. 
Figure 38: Neural Network for Proposed System with 10 inputs, 1 outputs and 3 dimensional 1 hidden layer 
As we know, the artificial neural networks can work effectively only when it has been trained 
correctly. So, the first step of the Detection Module is training. That is to say, given a set of 
intrusion samples, according to the BP algorithm, the Detection Module will learn what is 
normal, what is abnormal, and what an intrusion is. When the training target has been reached, 
the training procedure finished, and the Detection Module has memorized the knowledge on 
how to analyze and determine whether an intrusion event happens or not. Then the trained 
Detection Module can be used to analyze the network stream captured by the data collection 
module. The training algorithm that we have used in our proposed system is as follows in 
figure 39: 
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Algorithm 2. (Training Algorithm) 
Training Algorithm 0 
Input: Processed Data - Featured Vector with 6 Attributes (V) 
Output: Anomalous Packets (A), Normal Packets (N) 
Begin 
1. Set all weights to random values ranging from -1.0 to +1.0 
2. Set an input pattern to the neurons of the net's input layer 
3. Activate each neuron of the following layer: 
Multiply the weight values of the connections leading to this 
neuron with the output values of the preceding neurons 
Add up these values 
Pass the result to an activation function, which computes the 
output value of this neuron 
Repeat this until the output layer is reached 
4. Compare the calculated output pattern to the desired target pattern and 
compute an error value 
5. Change all weight values of each weight matrix using the formula: 
- weight(old) + learning rate * output error * output(neurons i) * 
output(neurons i+1) * ( 1 - output(neurons i+1) ) 
6. Go to step 2 
7. The algorithm ends, if all output patterns match their target patterns 
End 
Figure 39: Learning Algorithm 
Now we are describing how the training process will be running with the following example: 
We will follow our neural network structure as in figure 43. We have selected six input 
variables from the feature vector as following table 21. We have converted all values of the 
feature vectors into numeric values. To simplify calculation we divide each value by its 
decimal numbers and take up to precision level 3. 
SrcMAC = 00:14:D1:3A:71:E4 = 0014D13A71E4 = 89409614308 
= 89409614308 /10000000000 = 0.89409614308 
= 0.894 
destMAC = 00:1F:3A:57:5A:49 = 001F3A575A49 = 134122789449 
= 0.134 
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ESSID = ZILLUR - 907376768582 
= 0.907 
Xj 
SrcMAC 
89409614308 
x2 
destMAC 
134122789449 
X3 
srcPort 
80 
X4 
destPort 
52580 
x5 
Packet Size 
110 
x6 
ESSID 
907376768582 
X] 
0.894 
x2 
0.134 
Xi 
0.80 
X4 
0.525 
x5 
0.11 
x6 
0.907 
Table 21: Initial Input 
Then we set all weights and biases values to random values ranging from -1.0 to +1.0. 
W/7 
0.2 
wis 
-0.3 
w19 
0.4 
W27 
0.1 
*V28 
-0.5 
W29 
0.2 
W37 
-0.3 
W38 
-0.2 
w39 
0.1 
w47 
-0.2 
w48 
0.3 
W49 
-0.1 
w57 
-0.4 
W>5S 
0.3 
w59 
-0.2 
w67 
0.5 
W68 
-0.3 
n>69 
-0.5 
W710 
0.2 
wsio 
0.4 
W910 
-0.4 
Table 22: Initial weights 
07 
-0.4 
6>, 
0.2 
09 
0.5 
O10 
0.3 
Table 23: Initial bias values 
Now we will calculate Net Inputs to Hidden Layer using the following equation: 
Ij = S, wu Ot + 6j 
where, Ij is net input for unity, 
Wjj is the weight of the connection from unit / in the previous layer to unity, 
Oj is the output of unit i from the previous layer, and 
9j is the bias of the unity. 
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h = 0.894 x 0.2+ 0.134 x 0.1 + 0.80 x (-0.3) + 0.525 x (-0.2) + 0.11 x (-0.4) + 0.907 x 0.5 
+ (-0.4) 
= 0.1788 + 0.0134 - 0.24 - 0.105 - 0.044 + 0.4535 - 0.4 = 0.6457 - 0.789 
= -0.1433 
Ig = 0.894 x (-0.3) + 0.134 x (-0.5) + 0.80 x (-0.2) + 0.525 x 0.3 + 0.11 x 0.3 + 0.907 x (-
0.3) + 0.2 
= - 0.2682 - 0.067 - 0.16 + 0.2575 + 0.033 - 0.2721 + 0.2 = - 0.7673 + 0.4905 
= - 0.2768 
I9 = 0.894 x 0.4 + 0.134 x 0.2 + 0.80 x 0.1 + 0.525 x (-0.1) + 0.11 x (-0.2) + 0.907 x (-0.5) 
+ 0.5 
= 0.3576 + 0.0268 + 0.08 - 0.0525 - 0.022 - 0.4535 + 0.5 = 0.9644 - 0.528 
= 0.4364 
Output for hidden layer, O,• = 1 / (1 + e'!J) 
0 7 = 1 / (1 + e 01433) = 1 / (1 + 1.154076) = 1 / 2.154076 = 0.464236 
0 8 = 1 / (1 + e 02768) = 1 / (1 + 1.318903) = 1 / 2.318903 = 0.431238 
0 9 = 1 / (1 + e" ° 4364) = 1 / (1 + 0.646359) =1/1.646359 = 0.6074 
Net Input for output layer, Ij = £, wy Ov + 0j 
I10 = 0.4642 x 0.2 + 0.4013 x 0.4 + 0.2689 x (- 0.4) + 0.3 
= 0.1025 + 0.1605 - 0.1076 + 0.3 = 0.563 - 0.1076 
= 0.4554 
Output for output layer, 0, = 1 / (1 + e 'lj) 
d o = 1 / (1 + e -°-4554) = 1 / (1 + 0.634194) = 1 /1.634194 = 0.6119 
The error is propagated backwards by updating the weights and biases to reflect the error of the 
network's predictions. The error is calculated by the following equation for Output Layers: 
Errj=Oj(l-Oj)(Tj-Oj) 
Where Oj is the actual output of unit j , and Tj is the true output, based on the known class level 
of the given training sample. Here the class level that we consider is 1. 
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Err,o = 0.6119x (1- 0.6119) x (1- 0.6119) = 0.6119 x 0.3881 x 0.3881 = 0.0921 
The Error for hidden layer units are calculated using following equations: 
Errj = Oj (1 - Oj) £* Errk wjk 
Err9 = 0.6074 x (1 - 0.6074) x (0. 0921 x (-0.4)) 
= 0.2689 x 0.3926 x (- 0.0458) 
= - 0.0038 
Err8 = 0.4312 x (1 - 0.4312) x (0.0921 x 0.4) 
= 0.4312x0.5688x0.0368 
= 0.0090 
Err7 = 0.4642 x (1 - 0.4642) x (0.0921 x 0.2) 
= 0.4642x0.5358x0.0184 
= 0.0045 
The weights and biases are updated to reflect propagated errors. Weights are updated by the 
following equation: 
wij = Wjj + (1) En} Oj 
Where, / is learning rate. We consider here, / = 0.9. 
Weight updating: 
W710 
W810 
W910 
W17 
W i 8 
W , 9 
W 2 7 
W 2 8 
W 2 9 
W37 
W38 
W39 
= Wy+ (1) Errj Oi 
= w^ + (1) Errj Oj 
= WiJ + ( l ) E r r j O i 
= w ^ + (1) Errj Oi 
= w ^ + (1) Errj Oj 
= Wij + ( l )Err jOi 
= Wij + ( l )Err jOi 
= Wy + (1) Errj Oi 
= wy + (1) Errj Oj 
= w,j + ( l )Err jOi 
= w i j + ( l ) E n j O i 
= Wij + ( l )Err jOi 
= 0.2 + (0.9)(0.0921)(0.4642) = 0.2384 
= 0.4 + (0.9)(0.0921)(0.4312) = 0.4357 
= (-0.4) + (0.9)(0.0921)(0.6074) = - 0.3496 
= 0.2 + (0.9)(0.0045)(0.894) = 0.2036 
= -0.3 + (0.9)(0.0090)(0.894) = - 0.2927 
= 0.4 + (0.9)(- 0.0038)(0.894) = 0.3964 
= 0.1 + (0.9X0.0045X0.134) = 0.1005 
= -0.5 + (0.9)(0.0090)(0.134) = - 0.4889 
= 0.2 + (0.9)(- 0.0038)(0.134) = 0.1995 
= -0.3 + (0.9)(0.0045)(0.80) = - 0.2967 
= -0.2 + (0.9)(0.0090)(0.80) = - 0.1935 
= 0.1 + (0.9)(- 0.0038)(0.80) = 0.0972 
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W47 = Wjj + (1) ElTj O 
W48 = Wjj + (1) ElTj O 
W49 = Wjj + (1) ElTj O 
W57 = Wij + (1) En-j O 
w58 = Wjj + (1) En-j O 
w 5 9 = Wy + (1) Errj O 
W67 = Wjj + (1) ElTj O 
w68 = Wy + (1) En-j O 
w69 = w,j + (1) En-j O 
= -0.2 + (0.9)(0.0045)(0.525) = - 0.1978 
= 0.3 + (0.9)(0.0090)(0.525) = 0.3042 
= -0.1 + (0.9)(- 0.0038)(0.525) = - 0.1017 
= -0.4 + (0.9)(0.0045)(0.11) = - 0.3995 
= 0.3 + (0.9)(0.0090)(0.11) = 0.3008 
= -0.2 + (0.9)(- 0.0038X0.11) = - 0.2003 
= 0.5 + (0.9X0.0045X0.907) = 0.5036 
= -0.3 + (0.9)(0.0090)(0.907) = - 0.2926 
- -0.5 + (0.9)(- 0.0038)(0.907) = - 0.5031 
Now, the biases are updated by the following equations: 
ej = ej + 0)Errj 
Bias updating: 
810 = 6j + (1) En-j = 0.3 + (0.9)(0.6119) = 0.8507 
e9 - 6j + (1) En-j = 0.5 + (0.9)(- 0.6074) = - 0.0466 
08 = 9j + (1) En-j = 0.2 + (0.9)(0.4312) = 0.5880 
07 = 9j + (1) En-j = - 0.4 + (0.9)(0.4642) = 0.0177 
Thus the first input pattern had been propagated through the net by updating the weights and 
bias. The same procedure is used for the next input pattern, but then with the changed weight 
values. After the backward propagation of the pattern, one learning step is complete and the 
output error can be calculated by adding up the squared output errors of each pattern. By 
performing this procedure repeatedly, this error value gets smaller and smaller. The algorithm 
is successfully finished, if the error is zero (perfect) or approximately zero. 
The equation for calculating the root mean square error for a series of n values of x is as 
follows: 
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Xrms = V (Xl2 + X2 + ... + X„2) /H 
We got the root mean square error for training data, xrms = 0.0058, which is matched very 
closely with the desired root mean square (RMS) error of 0.0. 
An anomaly score is assigned to each packet calculating the difference between the output 
error and threshold. If the anomaly score is positive then the relevant wireless packet will be 
flagged as "Anomalous" and set an attack number to it for future comparison with incoming 
packets. If the anomaly score is zero or close to zero will be flagged as "Unknown" packet and 
it will send back to training process. Finally if the anomaly score is negative then the packet is 
flagged as "Normal". Then, these anomalous data packets are stored into the intrusion database 
and an attack number is assigned to all identified anomalous packets. The system will send 
back the "Unknown" packet to reevaluate into the training process. This reevaluating process 
will dynamically enhance the intrusion database of our proposed system. 
3.2.4. Decision Module: 
When detecting an intrusion, this module will send an alert message to the security 
administrator. After scrutinizing the data stream from Detection Module whether it is normal 
or anomalous, this module will make decision on the anomalous packets whether it is a known 
attack or unknown or normal. This module will estimate that the network stream is dangerous, 
and the network stream is the same or very similar with one of the attack type by matching 
with intrusion database which the Detection Module has been trained, then it will draw a 
conclusion that the network stream being detected can be classified into one attack type with 
the label "Attack". We have used the following algorithm in our decision module, figure 39. 
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Algorithm 3: (Decision Algorithm) 
Algorithm DecisionO 
Input: Anomaly Score (X), Attack Number (N) 
Output: Normal (M), Known Attack (K), Unknown Attack (U) 
Begin 
If positive anomaly score 
Level as Anomalous and match with attack database 
and trigger alert 
Else if negative anomaly score 
Skip it as Normal 
Else if zero or close to zero 
Level as Unknown Attack 
And send back to training process to reevaluate 
End 
Figure 39: Algorithm 3 - Decision Module 
When the Detection Module estimates that the network stream is Anomalous and decision 
module can not match with any known "Attack", but the threshold of the Detection Module has 
been reached, then this module will draw the conclusion that the network stream being detected 
is "Unknown". Here the "Unknown" virtually represents a new attack type which the Detection 
Module has not been trained to identify. The "Unknown" examples then will be added to the 
Training Samples of the BP Model, and after training with the "Unknown" examples, the 
Detection Module will have the ability to identify it accurately. After such a process, the 
"Unknown" becomes some known "Attack", which implies that the ability of the BP Model 
can be enhanced dynamically. 
All of these modules together constitute the NeoDetect prototype system based on the artificial 
neural networks, and the function of each module has been introduced briefly. 
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4. Experiments and Result Analysis: 
We have developed a prototype system to implement our proposed system NeuDetect which 
includes the algorithms and techniques described in section 3. We have used the programming 
language C#, MS SQL Server database engine and SQL Server Information Services (SSIS) to 
implement this. We also have used hardware sensor to capture wireless connection records 
before they reach the access point, then these captured records are preprocessed by Commview 
for NeuDetect software. The tool Commview outputs the captured records as csv file. Then this 
preprocessed csv file send to the Detection Module to flag anomalous connection packets. 
The main objective of this experiment is to prove that our proposed system NeuDetect is 
capable of detecting more types of wireless attacks than other system at a lower cost. We 
compared our system with Snort-Wireless (Air Snort 2007), which is the only open source 
wireless IDS, WiFi Miner (Ezeife and Rahman 2008) and Sensor-Based Online Clustering 
Approach for Wireless Intrusion Detection - WIDCA (Ezeife and Ejelike 2008). Due to the 
unavailability of labeled wireless data as normal or anomaly, we crafted our own packets to 
train and test the system. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 4.1 describes our test bed setup, section 
4.2 describes how we crafted the different types of attack packets for training and 4.3 describes 
how we tested our system and section 4.4 describes the test analysis of the results after 
comparing with other systems. 
4.1. Test Bed Setup: 
The test bed of our proposed system consists of three computers (PC-1, PC-2, and PC-3), one 
Proprietary wireless sensor (Network Chemistry), and one access point (AP). The network is 
setup as figure 40. We installed Network Chemistry sensor and Commview for WiFi in PC-1 
from where we scanned all Access Points in ranges and selected the AP for our wireless 
network and started capturing packets from our Access Point. We created a wireless network 
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with PC-2 and PC-3 where both were connected to AP. PC-2 is the attacker PC and PC-3 is the 
victim PC. 
Figure 40: Our Test Bed 
The hardware configurations of these PCs are as below: 
PC-1: Intel Pentium 4 1.87 GHz, 1.0 GB Ram, 60 GB Hard Drive 
PC-2: Intel Pentium 4, 2.0 GHz, 2.0 GB Ram, 160 GB Hard Drive 
PC-3: Intel Pentium 4, 2.2 GHz, 4.0 MB Ram, 250 GB Hard Drive 
4.2. Wireless Attacks Crafted for Training 
As we know it is hard to get wireless training sample data comprised with wireless attacks and 
normal data. Therefore, we have crafted following attacks using different available free tools 
and we captured these wireless attacks using sensors and then these captured records are 
preprocessed by Commview. Then Commview outputs the captured packets as csv file. 
Similarly we have preprocessed some normal innocent wireless packets by Commview after 
capturing with the sensor. 
• WEP Cracking Attack 
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• De-authentication Attack 
• Disassociation Attack 
• ARP Poisoning Attack 
• SYN Flood and UDP Flood Attacks 
• Man-in-the-Middle Attacks 
At first we have generated some innocentVnormal packets between PC-2 and PC-3 in figure 40. 
These packets were generated as a result of some innocent web browsing. Within 10 minutes 
time window we have captured about 20,000 packets. The following figure 41 shows that we 
captured these packets with the Network Chemistry sensor. Then we preprocessed these data 
with Commview for NeuDetect software. 
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Figure 41: Innocent wireless packets captured for training our system 
After that we collected 2100 anomalous packets (WEP Cracking attacks, De-authentication 
attacks, Disassociation attacks, ARP Poisoning attacks, SYN Flood attacks, UDP Flood attacks 
and Man-in-the-Middle attacks - about 300 packets from each type) and mixed these 2100 
anomalous packets with 20,000 innocent packets and input these total combined 22,100 dataset 
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for training into the Detection Module of our proposed system where we implement the Back-
Propagation algorithm. 
In the rest of the section we will discuss about crafting these attack packets. 
Crafting Attack Packets for Training: 
To craft attacks, we have used BackTrack network security suite (BackTrack 2007). 
BackTrack is a Linux live distribution focused on penetration testing tools as a Live CD. 
Currently BackTrack consists of more than 300 different up-to-date security tools which are 
logically structured according to the work flow of security professional. We have used this 
BackTrack tool for crafting few wireless attacks for the training data of our system and also for 
testing our system. 
WEP Cracking Attack 
At first we stared the tools Kismet to monitor wireless traffic by clicking on the start key and 
browsing to Backtrack->Wireless Tools -> Analyzers ->Kismet. We use Kismet to find the 
bssid, essid, channel number of the Access Points (AP) and also type of encryption (WEP) that 
we will be accessing. We select the AP we want to access, then we copy and paste the 
broadcast name (ESSID), MAC address (BSSID) and channel number of the selected AP into a 
text editor. Here, the Access Point is NeuDetect for our experiments. 
Then we open up a new terminal window and start the tool Airodump, 802.11 packet capture 
tool, so we can collect ARP replies from the target AP. 
We captured some packets from our Access Point (NeuDetect) and from there we spoofed a 
valid client's MAC address. Then we started BackTrack security tool and using the Aireplay 
[52] utility we sent authentication and association request to NeuDetect AP as in figure 42. The 
following command we have used: 
Aireplay-ng -1 0 -e NeuDetect -a 00:14:D1:3A: 71:E4 -h 00:0E:35:07:A7:FC ethO 
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Here, -1 means attack mode, 0 means continuously, -e is the option for SSID of target AP, -a 
denotes the target AP's MAC, -h denotes source MAC and ethO is the network card. 
Then we started sending fake ARP packets to NeuDetect AP so that we can capture the replies 
through Airodump. Once we have captured enough packets then we started Aircrack utility to 
decrypt the WEP key as figure 43. In few minutes time interval Aircrack decrypted the WEP 
key. 
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Figure 42: Fake Authentication Packets 
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Figure 43: NeuDetect AP to decrypt WEP Key 
90 
The sensor captured all of these attacking packets and we used Commview software to 
preprocess these crafted attack packets and it generated a csv file containing these attacks. 
De-authentication Attack: 
A host authenticates to a WEP protected AP there are six packets involved (Deckerd and 
Hindarto 2006) in the authentication. Two of these packets can be used to crack the WEP key. 
Below is a capture of a six packet authentication between the client, 00:14:6C:6C:AA:77, and 
the AP, 00:OF:66:2B:8A:CF. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
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Figure 44: Six Authentication Packets 
1. Client sends Probe Request with ESSID to the broadcast address. 
2. AP with matching ESSID responds indicating the AP's MAC address and other available 
options. 
3. Client acknowledges probe response. 
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4. AP sends encrypted challenge text to client. 
5. Client deciphers challenge text and responds with the challenge text encrypted using the 
shared key. 
6. The AP verifies that the challenge text is correct and responds indicating that authentication 
was successful. 
To craft attacks we are interested in capturing packet number four and five; the challenge text 
exchange between the AP and client. Both of these packets are encrypted using the shared 
WEP key and therefore can be used to crack the WEP key. 
We use aireplay-ng to de-authenticate a host using the —deauth option. This attack will send a 
spoofed deauthentication request as the AP to the client (Deckerd and Hindarto 2006). To 
perform this attack we used the target's MAC address, option -c below and the target AP 
BSSID, option -a below. Both of these can be gathered using Kismet. 
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Network L is t iChannels 
,-*, teee • ,-. - 1 'n *"h, PacHs F l a p IP Range* 
f, H**\*<sH Detail's - - ' . - — , 
i : * - , ' - > » , : ! • • -. . ' J 
, '*v, f I- if " . *> r 
Figure 45: Kismet Network Details and Target AP BSSID 
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Figure 46: Kismet Client List 
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Figure 47: De-authentication attacks using Aireplay-ng 
The sensor captured all of these attacking packets and we used Commview software to 
preprocess these crafted attack packets and it generated a csv file containing these attacks. 
Disassociation Attack: 
Disassociation messages, however, are not as regular as application data. They must be 
injected through the data link layer to convey management information employed in 802.11 
standards. To craft disassociation attack we have used a tool called Air-jack which provides 
direct utilities for sending association and de-authentication frames. 
To craft attacks we have supplied correct arguments such as the interface, AP's MAC, victim's 
MAC, and source's MAC (same as AP's MAC). The disassociation frames have sent to the 
intended victim and cause it to disassociate with the access point. 
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After sending disassociation packets using Air-jack we monitored kismet and found 
disassociation happened as showed in figure 49. We also tried to ping the affected host and it 
was not responding as showed in figure 50. 
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Figure 48: Disassociation showed in Kismet 
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Figure 49: Destination host unreachable after pinging 
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The sensor captured all of these attacking packets and we used Commview software to 
preprocess these crafted attack packets and it generated a csv file containing these attacks. 
ARP Poisoning Attack 
To generate the attack first of all we have to search for a host on which we want to mount the 
attack. We have used NMAP to get the list of hosts which are currently up in the network. 
Once we get the IP addresses we can start crafting attack any one or all of the hosts with 
another tool named ettercap. 
The following command we have used in NMAP for searching host: 
#nmap-sP 192.168.1.* 
•h«lt - N D M 
---append-output Append t o , r a t h e r than c lobber s p e c i f i e d output f i l e s 
- - s e n d - e t h / - - s e n d - i p : Send using raw e the rne t frames or IP packets 
- - p r i v i l e g e d : Assume t h a t the user i s f u l l y p r i v i l e g e d 
., - - u n p r i v i l e g e d : Assume the user lacks raw socket p r i v i l e g e s 
-V: P r i n t v e r s i o n number 
• -h P r i n t t h i s he lp summary paqe. 
EXAMPLES, 
nmap -v -A scanme.nmap.org 
nmap -.1 -sP 192.168.0 >V16 10 .Q.0 .0 /8 
' nmap -v - iR 10000 -PN -p 88 
SEE THE ['IAN PAGE FOR'MANY MORE OPTIONS, DESCRIPTIONS, AND EXAMPLES 
nmap -sP 192.168 l . t 
' t i n g Nmap 4 . 2 0 C h t t p : / / i n s e c u r e . o r g ) a t 2 0 0 7 - 1 1 - 0 6 1 3 : 
. 1 9 2 . 1 5 8 . 1 . 1 a p p e a r s t o be u p . 
A d d r e s s : O O : 1 C : 1 0 : 9 E : 8 C : D 1 (Unknown) 
: 1 9 2 . 1 5 8 . 1 . 1 0 0 a p p e a r s t o be u p . 
: 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 1 0 1 a p p e a r s t o be u p . 
A d d r e s s : 0 0 : 1 3 : 0 2 : 3 B : 1 A : 8 C ( I n t e l C o r p o r a t e ) 
L 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 1 0 9 a p p e a r s t o be u p . 
A d d r e s s : 0 0 : 1 2 : 1 7 : 9 A - : 8 C : D 5 ( C i s c o - L i n h s y s ) 
f i n i s h e d : ' 2 5 b I P ' a d d r e s s e s ( 4 h o s t s up) s canned i n 4 8 . 4 5 0 se 
Figure 50: NMAP Output 
To craft a simple ARP Poisoning attack, on the attacking machine, first start the browser and 
then use the following command: 
#ettercap -T -Q -M arp:remote -i ethl /192.168.1.102/ // -P remote_browser 
Where, 
• -T starts ettercap in text mode. 
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• -Q will make ettercap be superQuiet (not print raw packets in the terminal 
window) 
• -M starts man in the middle mode, and 
• arp:remote is the type of poisoning, and remote is a parameter for MITM. These 
options can be combined into one switch like -TQM. 
• ethl is the network interface used in the attacking machine. 
• 192.168.1.102 is the IP address of the victim. 
The above command will log all the URLs that the victim visits on the attacker's computer. 
Also this will let a netscape-based browser (Mozilla, Firefox, Netscape etc) on the attacking 
machine silently follow the web pages that a victim machine visits. The following figure 52 
shows the screenshot of the output of the above command. 
:S#siort ; Sdit:; MeW: !;Befo;t?marks." iettirYgS: [ Help 
QBPjUpsbsil 
Figure 51: Ettercap output 
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The sensor captured all of these attacking packets and we used Commview software to 
preprocess these crafted attack packets and it generated a csv file containing these attacks. 
SYN Flood and UDP Flood Attacks 
We have used Engage Packet builder v2.2.0 to craft SYN Flood and UDP Flood attacks which 
has downloaded from www.enfiagesecurity.com. It is Powerful and scriptable Libnet-based 
packet builder for Windows platform. It is useful to build personalized packet with the aim of 
testing the security of firewall, network, etc. (TCP, IP, UDP, ICMP) and useful to send packets 
in wireless 802.11 a/b/g network. 
In SYN Flood attack, the attacker sends a lot of TCP packets, where both SYN and 
(ACKnowledgment) ACK flags in the header are set to 1 using Engage Packet Builder. The 
attacker's IP address is faked and destination IP address is the server victim's address. 
Receiving so many packets from attacker prevents victim from accepting new legitimate 
requests and may crash the victim server. To craft these attack packets we open the Engage 
Packet Builder software and specify the Network Interface card at top left corner and select the 
tab for TCP packets at top right corner. Then put some fake IP address (192.168.1.101) at the 
place of source IP address and at destination IP address we put the victim's IP address 
(192.168.1.102). At source port we put some arbitrary port number (80) and destination port is 
some vulnerable port (8080). At the flags tab at the interface we set SYN and ACK. Then we 
start the web server by clicking the button at low right corner. Then we specify the number of 
packets to be sent at Nb of Packets: 100. Then we press SEND button and it will start sending 
the TCP SYN Flood attack packets to the victim's PC. The interface for creating the TCP SYN 
Flood attack is shown in figure 52. To create UDP flood packets, we need to go to the UDP tab 
besides TCP tab and specify random destination port at each time and send UDP flood packets 
to the victim's PC. Interface for creating UDP Flood packets is shown in figure 53. 
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Figure 53: Crafting UDP Flood Attack packets 
Once these attack packets are sent to the victim's PC we can capture these attack packets from 
the PC equipped with sensor and Commview. Then we output these packets in csv format to 
further preprocess for training purpose. 
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Man-In-The-Middle Attacks 
To gather attack packets for Man-In-the-Middle type of attack, we set up a rogue AP with the 
same SSID (Service Set Identifier) as the legitimate one in a place nearer than the legitimate 
AP. To be successful with this attack we placed the rouge AP at least 5 channels away from the 
legitimate AP. Then, using the spoofed client's MAC address we sent de-authentication 
packets using Aireplay of BackTrack security tool. As a result, the targeted client is 
disconnected from the legitimate AP and is connected to the rogue AP because of the stronger 
signal. 
In our experiment the legitimate AP was NeuDetect (MAC address: 00-14-D1-3A-71-E4) 
operating at channel 3 and the victim's MAC address was 00:0E:35:D7:A7:FC, which was 
connected to the legitimate AP. We placed another router with the same SSID (NeuDetect) at 
channel 10 and placed it near victim's PC. Initially no PC was connected to the rogue AP. 
Then from another PC booted with BackTrack, we launched Aireplay and issued the following 
command as shown in figure 54: 
aireplay-ng -0 100 -a 00:14:D1:3A:71:E4 -c 00:0E:35:D7:A7:FCathO 
Here, -0 means deauthentication, 100 is the number of deauthentication packet to be sent, -a 
00:14:D1:3A:71:E4 is the legitimate AP's MAC address, -c 00:0E:35:D7:A7:FC is victim's 
MAC address and athO is the network card in use. This step is shown in Figure 54. As a result, 
the targeted host disconnect from the legitimate AP. The disconnected victim PC then rescans 
wireless channels and connects to the rogue AP. 
These de-authentication packets were captured and gathered as anomalous packets with 
Commview for NeuDetect software. 
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Figure 54: Sending Deauthentication packets to AP 
Finally we have combined all of those csv files for different attack packets and also for normal 
packets into one csv file as showed in figure 55. 
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Figure 55: Preprocessed combined attack and normal packets 
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From this combined csv file, we have selected the parameters for feature vector as specified in 
the section 3 and uploaded all data of the feature vector into a text file to run through the 
Detection module of our proposed system for training process. The training process was done 
when we got the root mean square error is equal to 0.0058, which is close to zero, after several 
retry of adjusting the values of weights, bias, learning rate as trial and adjustment basis. 
4.3. Test Results 
After doing the training with the normal and attack data packets that described in the section 
4.3, we have generated similar attack packets following the same steps to test our system 
whether it is capable to detect the attacks or not. To do the test we have crafted total about 
1400 attack packets which includes 200 for each attacks of WEP Cracking Attacks, De-
authentication Attacks, Disassociation Attacks, ARP Poisoning Attacks, SYN Flood and UDP 
Flood Attacks, and also Man-in-the-Middle Attacks. Then we run these packets into the 
Detection Module of our system and it outputs some packets as alert which have positive 
anomaly score and some of them matches with the attacks listed in the attack training database. 
Then we calculate the anomaly detection rate and false alarm rate. We tested the same attack 
dataset with SNORT Wireless, Wifi-Miner (Apriori association rule based) and WIDCA 
(Clustering Technique based) system to compare our system with these three existing system. 
Attacks 
WEP Cracking 
De-authentication 
Disassociation 
ARP Poisoning 
SYN Flood 
UDP Flood 
Man-in-the-Middle 
Total 
No. of 
Attacks 
200 
200 
200 
200 
200 
200 
200 
1400 
Snort-
Wireless 
138 
142 
139 
148 
145 
144 
136 
992 
Wifi-Miner 
174 
170 
172 
175 
169 
166 
167 
1193 
WIDCA 
182 
185 
179 
183 
175 
168 
180 
1252 
NeuDetect 
187 
195 
194 
185 
190 
182 
189 
1322 
Table 24: Attacks Detected 
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m Snort-Wireless 
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• WIDCA 
m NeuDetect 
WEP De-authent Disasst ARP SYN UDP Man-in-
Cracking Poisoning tile-Middle 
Figure 56: Attacks Detection Comparison 
Attacks 
WEP Cracking 
De-authentication 
Disassociation 
ARP Poisoning 
SYN Flood 
UDP Flood 
Man-in-the-Middle 
Snort-
Wireless 
69% 
71% 
69.5 % 
74% 
72.5 % 
72% 
68% 
Wifi-Miner 
87% 
85% 
86% 
87.5 % 
84.5 % 
83% 
83.5 % 
WIDCA 
91% 
92.5 % 
89.5 % 
91.5% 
87.5 % 
84% 
90% 
NeuDetect 
93.5 % 
97.5 % 
97% 
92.5 % 
9 5 % 
91% 
94.5 % 
Table 25: Attack-wise Detection Rate 
IDS 
Snort-Wireless 
WIDCA 
Will-Miner 
NeuDetect 
Detection Rate 
70.86 % 
89.42 % 
85.21 % 
94.42 % 
False Negative % 
29.14% 
10.57% 
14.79 % 
05.58 % 
Table 26: Detection Rate and False Negative 
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Figure 57: Detection Rate and False Negative Comparison 
In our experiment, we also tested the false positive in our system. We know the false positive 
happens when a system flags an alert but in reality it should not be an alert. To perform this 
test, we crafted some normal packets (about 5000) to launch into our system and compared the 
same to other systems as showed in table 27. 
IDS 
Snort-Wireless 
WIDCA 
Wifi-Miner 
NeuDetect 
No. of Normal 
Packets 
5000 
5000 
5000 
5000 
Packets 
Detected 
359 
127 
236 
98 
False 
Positive % 
7.18% 
2.54 % 
4.72 % 
1.96% 
Table 27: False Positive Rate 
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Figure 58: False Positive Rate Comparison 
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Unknown Attack: 
We have crafted an attack which was not used for training of our system to check whether our 
system is able to detect it or not. To craft this attack, we sent crafted forged control, 
management and data frames to the wireless network using File2air named tool. We used the 
following command to send the attack from shell console: 
File2air -n 200 -I athO -s 00:14:D1:3A: 71:E4 -d 00:0E:35:D7:A 7:FC -fpath for file 
-f: is the location of the file to be replayed into the network, it must be in binary form 
-n: is the number of packets to send 
IDS 
NeuDetect 
No. of Unknown 
Packets 
200 
Packets 
Detected 
178 
False 
Negative % 
11.0% 
Table 28: Testing Unknown Attack 
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4.4. Result Analysis: 
We see from table 24 that our system, NeuDetect, performed better than SNORT-Wireless, 
WIDCA and Wifi-Miner. In table 25 gives an overview of specific attack detection rate. From 
there we can see that NeuDetect performed better in detecting De-authentication and 
Disassociation attacks than other attacks. In case of the detection rate of UDP Flood attack, 
NeuDetect detected less than average detection rate of other of attacks but still in comparison 
to SNORT Wireless and WIDCA and Wifi-Miner, it performed better. 
In table 26 gives the comparison of an average detection rate and false negative rates where we 
can see the attack detection rate of our system is higher as well as the false negative rate is also 
reduced than those systems. 
In table 27 shows the comparison of the false positive rate. Our system also performed better in 
reducing false positive rate. From table 28, we can see that our system has the ability to detect 
the unknown attacks which was not taught to detect in the training phase. Everyday we are 
experiencing new type of attacks, it is an outstanding feature of our system that it can detect 
the unknown new intrusions. 
We used hardware sensor in our system to ensure that all packets sent to the access points are 
captured and sent to our system for analysis. Snort and most other wireless IDS depends on 
packets that passes through the wireless router. 
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5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
In this thesis, we proposed and implemented a wireless intrusion detection system: NeuDetect, 
which uses Neural Network techniques to detect anomalous wireless packets by using training 
data. We have used back-propagation algorithm to train the system, then our algorithm was 
designed for Anomaly Score calculation which assigns a score to each wireless packet. Positive 
anomaly score for specific wireless packet means anomalous pattern while a negative anomaly 
score indicates a normal pattern of that wireless packets. We have also used proprietary 
Network Chemistry hardware sensors to capture real-time traffic in order to improve intrusion 
response time. 
We researched and discussed various wireless attacks possible in a wireless network. Based on 
our research on well-known wireless intrusions, we demonstrated how these attacks can be 
crafted and how it can be captured using our system. We crafted few types of attacks to use as 
training data and also for testing our system. In testing phase we have compared our system 
with three other wireless intrusion detection systems and found our system is more efficient. 
We also used Hardware Sensor to capture wireless packets from specific access points to get 
the advantage of real time traffic monitoring to improve intrusion response time. Some other 
IDS use net-flow data from routers instead of capturing from airwaves, but in our system we 
captures real-time wireless data from airwaves. 
In detection of the known intrusion, our system has a better performance with high correctly 
detection rate and a low false alarm rate. Specially, our system can detect unknown intrusions 
with an acceptable false alarm rate. Everyday we are experiencing new type of attacks, it is an 
outstanding feature of our system that it can detect the unknown new intrusions. 
There is still room for improvement in our system. Currently in our system, if the anomaly 
score does not match with the trained anomaly score database and the corresponding attack 
number then the false alarm will be triggered. In future, to reduce the false alarm rate for this 
reason we may improve our Decision Module by implementing clustering approach instead of 
just comparing with the numeric values i.e. anomaly score. We will work to develop some 
adaptive process for weight and learning rate adjustment to reduce training processing time for 
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large dataset. We will enhance the ability of the Detection Module of our system to detect the 
unknown new intrusions. We will also be working towards making our system generalized so 
that it can be used for both wired and wireless intrusion detection. In order to avoid 
unreasonable complexity in the neural network, an initial classification of the connection 
records to normal and general categories of attacks can be the first step and the records in each 
category of intrusions can then be further classified to the attack type, which will also be in our 
future enchantment list. 
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